International Conference: Current Security Challenges for the Western Balkan Region Addressed by Means of Joint Responsibility and Cooperation 108 CONCLUDING REMARKS Brigadier Wolfgang Peischel Kant stated that social changes only create a new culture if they are supported by a moral value system and meet the categorical imperative. This means that radicalised forms of religions cannot expect tolerance if they violate fundamental human rights which correspond to an enlightened idea of man. If – and this was one of the core hypotheses of the conference – the integration of the states of the Western Balkans in the EU, and with it their incorporation in its common envelope of responsibilities, is identied as the strategic direction best suited to tackle the region's current security risks, then, following this logic, the EU should take steps to protect Muslims in their home countries from extremist forms of Islam. This demand was one of the core ndings of Panel 1. If moving closer to the EU is regarded as an option that promises success in combating security risks, then it must be understood that the EU has democracy as its functional principle. This means that any power the state has over its citizens can only be exercised on the basis of laws legitimised through democratic, direct or indirect majority decisions. The point of Islam becoming a problem as states move closer to the EU is therefore not a question of tolerance vis-à-vis other religions; it is clearly impossible for a democracy to accept that religions can dene norms which would enfetter citizens – simply because the religions' leadership is not legitimated through elections. This discussion must lead to the conclusion that political Islam is not compatible with a western­style, democratic system, as it conicts with the democratic principle of the separation of church and state. It is, however, exactly this democratic compatibility which is one of the prerequisites for an integration of states in the EU. To begin with, the panel discussion on cyber security tried to counter the assumption that cyber terrorism is the weapon of small, radical groups, with which they- similar to David and Goliath- can attack and blackmail larger states without said state being able to protect itself effectively. This would only be true if the potential target states did not invest in protective measures. There are, in fact, technical possibilities available to larger states and regional cooperations which, given the necessary nancial commitments, offer protection against attacks, make it possible, following an attack, to restore IT infrastructure speedily, so that any damage is kept to a minimum, and to localise the attackers and to identify them to such a degree that counterattacks are made possible. What must be regarded critically, however, are developments which, by 2020, would make it possible for large states to'switch off' states expected to carry out cyber attacks. The electronic paralysis of a state representing a cyber threat is not the biggest problem – the concurrent electronic elimination of the attacker's neighbouring states is. Such an event could be considered if the attack is started from neighbouring territories, in order to deect suspicion or to circumvent the paralysis of the logistic infrastructure of the attacking state by organising supplies from surrounding states. This could mean that especially smaller states, which have nothing to do with the cyber attack, get pushed into the role of a buffer due to their proximity to the potential attackers, and become the focus of cyber countermeasures. The discussion came to the conclusion that cyber terrorism can only contribute effectively to the long-term expansion of radical movements if the community of western states underestimates the threat and invests too little in electronic countermeasures.