2025 /SPOT LIGHT Dezember 2024 The ongoing German Zeitenwende Christos Katsioulis Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has shaken Germany to the core. On the one hand, there are the direct consequences of the war, such as inflation, countless war refugees from Ukraine and more complex demands on German defence policy, to name but a few. On the other hand, the invasion has permanently altered the foreign and security policy conceptions of both German politicians and citizens. This paper focuses on the second dimension of the Zeitenwende. The question is, to what extent has the German population’s world view changed, how has their outlook on security challenges developed and what policy conclusions can be drawn from this? To answer these questions we draw on three surveys carried out within the framework of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Security Radar in 2021, 2022 and 2024. The survey focus was European security, with a particular emphasis on Ukraine. The autumn 2021 survey provides a useful point of departure, highlighting what perceptions and priorities dominated security policy and to what extent Russia was regarded as a threat before its all-out war of aggression against Ukraine. This can be used as reference when it comes to drawing conclusions about the extent of people’s» Zeitenwende in the head«. The survey analysis highlights three interesting developments from which policy recommendations may be drawn. 1. Popular conceptions of Russia in Germany have changed for good Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally altered Germans’ attitude to it. We can begin with perceptions of Russia as a threat to European security. This has increased significantly since 2021 and 73% of Germans now hold this view. Hand in hand with this goes the perception that Russian and European interests are diametrically opposed. This conviction has also consolidated, rising from 46% to 60% support, with only 19% of Germans taking a different view. These perceptions have a direct influence on respondents’ attitudes to cooperation with Russia and support for sanc ­tions: 53% favour stepping up sanctions, while 36% are against. The proportion of those opposed has largely remained constant, while support for sanc ­tions has risen substantially(from 38% in 2021). 1