ANALYTICAL NOTE Nr. 3/ FES PSCC ANALYTICAL NOTE Nr. 3 / FES PSCC THE RISING INFLUENCE OF GULF AND MIDDLE EASTERN POWERS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY Dr. Ngala CHOME January, 2025 SOUTH SUDAN SUMMARY Middle powers in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East have been gradually building strategic partnerships in the Horn of Africa region during the past decade, often through agricultural and mining deals, defence pacts and public infrastructure projects. Preferring personalised relations with the region’s power brokers, these transactional, interest-driven partnerships have crystallised into new networks for regional influence and power. The rivalry and competition among the Horn’s rulers over these new sources of money and power, leveraged to secure loyalty and fund violence for survival, have created a potent catalyst for regional instability. This geopolitical development has grown out of a wider multipolar world, where multiple middle powers have emerged to challenge the unfettered influence of a global hegemon(the U.S and the West), putting, as a result, the limits of a rules­based, international order to test. In the wake of shifting geopolitical realities in the Horn, this article proposes hybrid and pragmatic approaches to peace diplomacy, that must anchor normative principles in the realities of power politics. For the Horn of Africa(HoA), 2024 began with a surprise fractious Memorandum of Understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa that bore wider regional implications. 1 Ethiopia’s maritime deal with the self-proclaimed independent republic of Somaliland would have allowed Ethiopia access to 20 km of Somaliland’s coastline. In exchange for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty, Somaliland offered the landlocked Ethiopia a gateway to the Gulf of Aden for commercial and naval military use for 50 years. 2 The MoU was vehemently rejected by Somalia, which considers Somaliland part of its territory. In a rare flash of Somali nationalistic fervour, its Federal Government rallied allies across the region to oppose Ethiopia. 3 Regional alliances formed in fear and anticipation of the eventuality of open hostilities. 4 But by year’s end, regional tensions had calmed, 1 Kalkidan Yibeltal,“Ethiopia signs agreement with Somaliland paving way to sea access.” 2 January 2024, BBC News<https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-africa-67858566> 17 January 2025. 2 Aleksi Yionen“Somaliland Has Been Pursuing Independence for 33 Years: Expert Explains the Impact of the Latest Deal with Ethiopia,” 24 January 2024, The Conversation<https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been­pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the­latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502> 17 January 2025. 3 Mohamud Abdulaziz Abdisamad and Kalkidan Yibeltal,“Somalia calls Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement act of aggression,” 2 January 2024, BBC News <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390> 17 January 2025. 4 Kalkidan Yibeltal and Damien Zane,“Ethiopia-Somaliland deal: Can the Horn of Africa rift be healed?” 3 July 2024, BBC News<https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-67911057> 17 January 2025; Staff Writer,“Africa File: Islamic State Suicide Attack in Somalia; AUSSOM Dysfunction; M23 Captures District Capital in Eastern DRC,” ISW Press , 9 January 2025< https://www. understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-january-9-2025-islamic­state-suicide-attack-somalia-aussom-dysfunction-m23> 17 January 2025. 1