The Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strate ­gy shares many threat perceptions with the document that preceded it but emphasizes US leadership on a more benign, inclusive note. Probably the most critical differ­ence from the first Trump NSS is that Biden’s strategy fo­cusses – as one of three“lines of effort” – on(re)building alliances, partnerships, and other inclusive coalitions with democracies(The White House 2022, p. 11). One of the most consequential issues in the US foreign policy debate over the last couple of years has been the question of how America should balance its interests and commitments in Europe with its involvement in other world regions, especially the Indo-Pacific. At the latest since Obama’s“pivot to Asia” in 2011, Washington has seen China as the most critical long-term challenge for the US. Peter Rough offers a useful characterization of the various approaches in the US debate when he distin­guishes between“traditional hawks and classical liber­als” on the one hand and“prioritizers” on the other. The former tend to view the challenges posed by Russia and China – as well as by other malign actors, such as Iran and North Korea – as being interlinked and“part of the same whole”(Rough 2024, p. 23). The strengthening of ­security cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea in the wake of the war in Ukraine bolsters their assertions. Analysts from conservative institutions, such as the American Enterprise Institute or the Heritage Foundation, advocate for higher defense budgets in order to provide sufficient resources for a more globalist and ambitious defense strategy(Eaglen 2022; Spoehr 2022). However, researchers from more liberal-leaning think tanks also share the“part of the same whole” threat ­perception. An expert group hosted by the United States Institute of Peace points to the“growing interdependence of deterrence dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic and the In­do-Pacific with the rise of strategic competition between the United States and China and Russia”(United States Institute of Peace(USIP) 2024, pp. 11–2). Hans Binnendi ­jk and Daniel Hamilton also stress that Russia and Chi ­na pose an integrated challenge to NATO for several reasons: their increasingly close defense and defense in­dustry cooperation; their threats to the freedom of navi ­gation and the global commons; and finally China’s in ­vestments in critical European infrastructure and tech­nologies, including ports, telecom, power grids, and defense-related supply chains(Binnendijk and Hamilton 2023). For similar reasons, Regina Karp and Richard Maass stress that NATO must not view China as an“out­of-area” problem (Karp and Maass 2024, p. 7). Proponents of this more globalist perspective also tend to emphasize Europe’s relevance for US security and eco­nomic interests. For instance, Luke Coffey(formerly Her­itage and now Hudson Institute) argues that“European stability, which Russia is trying to undermine, not only impacts the U.S. economy but also affects the American worker. In addition to a robust NATO, aiding Ukraine helps preserve stability in Europe”(Coffey 2024). Nile Gardiner and Robert Greenway from Heritage maintain that a“secure Europe and a robust Transatlantic Alliance, including the U.S./U.K. special relationship, advances the security of the American people”(Greenway and Gardiner 2024). The position adopted by Heritage analysts is particularly interesting as this conservative think tank – turned advo­cacy organization – was closely associated with Trump in the run-up to the 2024 elections. However, Heritage’s pre ­vious positions on foreign and security policy clearly col­lide with Trump’s pro-Russia, anti-Ukraine, and NATO-­skeptical policy. It will be interesting to see how Heritage will react and adapt to the new official policy. Contrary to the“traditional hawks and classical liberals,” in Rough’s depiction,“prioritizers” stress that from an American perspective the real challenge is China, much more than Russia. Elbridge Colby, nominated by Trump as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in his second administration, is one of the principal proponents of this perspective. Colby is also the co-founder of The Mara­thon Initiative, a think-tank dedicated to fostering foreign policy strategies on the assumption that“America cannot simply outspend…its rivals”(The Marathon Initiative). A recent study published by this think-tank concluded that European reliance on the US is unsustainable due to the United States’“deepening fiscal constraints and growing pressures from rival powers in multiple regions”(Ellis 2024, p. 3). Hardly anybody in the US debate – be they hawks, liber­als or prioritizers – is expecting a significant military con­tribution from NATO and its European members to con­front China in the Indo-Pacific. For a long time the Alli­ance did not even consider China as a major issue. Washington began to lobby harder in Brussels to take the challenge posed by China more seriously and conse­quently in 2019 NATO mentioned China in an official statement for the first time. The Alliance’s current Strate­gic Concept from 2022 states that China’s“ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and val­ues”(North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ ization 2022, p. 5). NATO has also strengthened its relationship with key partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially with the group known as IP4, i.e. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. A few analysts argue that individual NATO allies should participate to a greater extent in freedom of navigation op­erations in Asia(Binnendijk and Hamilton 2023, pp. 13–4). Others disagree. For instance, USIP’s expert group states that“it would be a mistake for the alliance to spread its military power even thinner by pursuing largely symbolic deployments and activities in the Indo-Pacific”(Council on Foreign Relations 2024). A common denominator among most analysts, however, is the view that NATO will have to 4 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.