the Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence initiative.” Maitra does not simply claim that NATO has become“woke,” but questions the usefulness of demo­cratic values for the Alliance as such. In his view, including non-democratic countries in NATO(Portugal before 1974 and Turkey) has done no damage to the Alliance’s core task of providing defense and deterrence(Maitra 2025). NATO Defense and Deterrence During Biden’s presidency(2021–2025) and even at the be ­ginning of the second Trump administration, US think-tank debate about NATO’s defense and deterrence posture was still dominated by Atlanticist and deterrence-oriented voic­es. The starting point of most analyses is that Russia is a major military threat that is set to grow even larger once the Ukraine war is over. The immediate focus has been on the scenario of a Russian attack on the Baltic States. Most esti­mates indicate that Russia would be able to fully reconsti­tute its armed(especially ground) forces within three to five years after the conclusion of the war in Ukraine(Kramer and Agachi 2024; The Alphen Group 2025, p. 7; Monaghan et al. 2024, pp. 2–3). This would give Russia both the capacity and the capability to either launch another full-scale invasion of Ukraine or to attack a European NATO country. Another fac­tor that plays into the threat perception vis-à-vis Russia is that China, Iran, and North Korea have supported Russia’s war in Ukraine in one way or another and might continue to align with Moscow beyond the conflict in Ukraine. However, differing views on how to deal with Russia have held sway, even among Atlanticist and deterrence-orient­ed analysts. On the one hand, there are those who advo­cate for worst-case military planning. For instance, Sean Monaghan from CSIS recommends NATO to return to the Cold War planning assumption of“maximum intentions.” As Soviet intentions were not known during the Cold War, the Alliance’s military planners considered Moscow’s“max­imum intentions and capabilities.” Monaghan takes the view that such an approach is warranted again today (Monaghan 2022, p. 7). On the other hand, there are those who are more cautious, pointing to escalation risks. A research team from the RAND Corporation recommends that, although a deliberate Rus­sian decision to attack NATO is a plausible scenario, NATO should strengthen its defensive posture“without appearing to enable a first strike on Russia” and“continue to signal that the United States and NATO allies have no plans to directly enter the[Ukraine] conflict”(Frederick et al. 2022, p. 8). Most of those in think-tanks who focus on NATO’s defense and deterrence posture welcome NATO’s shift from a mere “forward presence” at the eastern flank to more substantial “forward defense”; that is a shift that – according to one study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess­ments(CSBA) – includes“having sufficient combat-ready forces positioned and ready to‘fight tonight’”(van Tol et al. 2022, p. III). Mark Cancian, Sean Monaghan, and others re ­fer to this approach as“Repel, Don’t Expel.” It means that Russia must be denied the ability to conquer territory from one or all of the Baltic States in the first place. Cancian and Monaghan see NATO’s decision on forward deployment of brigades as a crucial step but stress the need to clarify the nature of this deployment, especially with regard to the ex­act size of the troops, where they will be stationed, which nations will contribute, and how the brigades will be sup­ported(Cancian and Monaghan 2023, pp. V–VIII). Mobilizing sufficient numbers of combat forces and trans­lating these numbers into actual combat power on the bat­tlefield will be a central problem for NATO. This will require filling significant capability gaps and addressing readiness challenges(Dowd et al. 2024, p. 2). In that sense, several researchers from CSIS also raise the question of whether NATO would also be prepared for a protracted war with Russia(Monaghan et al. 2024, p. 16). Another aspect of the debate concerns the way in which the recent accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO alters the military balance vis-à-vis Russia. Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, and other researchers from the Center for a New American Security(CNAS) stress that integration of the two northern countries’ very capable armed forces“will go a long way, enabling NATO to better fulfill its updated forward de­fense plans for its northeastern flank”(Lokker et al. 2023, p. 6). They also see an opportunity for the Alliance to create a comprehensive strategy for regional security in northern Eu­rope. The idea would be to treat northern Europe as a single theatre that encompasses both the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic. Luke Coffey from the Hudson Institute makes a similar argument. He proposes establishing an additional NATO battlegroup in Finland and increasing the Alliance’s maritime presence in the Baltic Sea(Coffey 2022, p. 1). Cyber, Space, New Technologies, Hybrid Threats As has often been discussed, defense issues have expanded beyond the traditional battlefield domains of land, water, and air to include two domains that cannot be defined in geo­graphical terms – the cyber realm and space. Moreover, the pace of technological change and innovation demands con­tinuous adaptation of defense concepts and capabilities. It therefore comes as no surprise that technology, cyber, and space feature in many think-tank analyses to varying degrees. For instance, Franklin Kramer and Anca Agachi stress how relevant it is for the Alliance to“incorporate the key elements of the ongoing technological revolution as exemplified by un­manned vehicles, additive manufacturing, low-Earth-orbit sat­ellites, and artificial intelligence.” In their view, NATO needs to take these developments into account“across its defense architecture, from capability development to acquisition to operations.” They advocate, among other things, using NA­TO’s Defense Planning Process“to define allied capability tar­gets for space and counter-space”(Kramer and Agachi 2024). 6 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.