deep strike capabilities within NATO. This is seen as a nec­essary step to counter Russia’s expanding and diversifying theater and tactical nuclear capabilities, i.e., weapons with lower explosive power and shorter reach(The Alphen Group 2025, p. 11). Some have also argued for the US to develop and deploy specific nuclear weapons in order to enhance the nuclear deterrent in support of European and Asian allies, such as a new sea-launched nuclear armed cruise missile (Kochis et al. 2022, pp. 5–6). Another recommendation con ­cerns the cohesion and cooperation of NATO’s three nuclear powers – the US, UK, and France. According to Nicholas Lokker and his co-authors from the Center for a New Ameri­can Security, allies should encourage France to work jointly with the United States and the United Kingdom to foster greater cohesion in their respective nuclear planning— ideally by France joining the Alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group(Lokker et al. 2023, p. 5). Finally, there has been a debate among experts on whether and how eastern NATO allies should be included in the nu­clear sharing arrangement(Donnelly et al. 2024, p. 1). The scope of these proposals varies. Some advocate that Poland (and potentially other eastern NATO countries) should ac­quire dual-capable aircraft and host US nuclear weapons on their soil(Peters 2023, p. 5). This has long been seen as a taboo within NATO. In 1997 the Alliance made a political commitment vis-à-vis Russia not to deploy nuclear weap­ons on the territory of the – then – new member states. However, in the light of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s announcement that it would deploy tactical nuclear weap­ons in Belarus, the Polish government brought up the idea of including Poland in the nuclear sharing arrangements. Others find the option of deploying nuclear weapons close to Russia too provocative and suggest“softer” options, such as vetting and training Polish F-35 pilots for nuclear operations.“Those pilots are seconded to an existing NATO DCA[Dual Capable Aircraft] unit and operate as an integral part of that unit, including for nuclear missions” (Edelman and Miller 2024, pp. 4–5). As is true for other NATO-related topics, the think-tank debate on nuclear deterrence has to some extent been overtaken by the radical policy shifts during the first two months of the second Trump presidency. Because nucle­ar weapons reflect a nation’s great power status, Trump is likely to emphasize their importance in America’s de­fense policy and to continue investing significant re­sources in modernization of these weapons. However, given his apparent desire to normalize relations with Russia, it is even less likely than previously that Wash­ington will expand or otherwise strengthen NATO’s nu­clear sharing arrangements. For similar reasons, it is even more unlikely than previously that France will be interested in moving closer to NATO’s nuclear structures. On the contrary: in March 2025 French President Emmanuel Macron renewed his previous offers to talk about the role of France’s force de frappe for European security outside of NATO. This time around, his offer might receive a warmer reception in Berlin and other European NATO capitals. Arms control has only played a marginal role in the US ex­pert debate, especially since Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022. The New Start Treaty is currently the last remaining major arms control treaty between the US and Russia. This treaty, concluded in 2011, did not simply stipu ­late numerical limits on nuclear warheads and long-range delivery systems on the Russian and US sides. It also creat­ed a comprehensive notification and verification regime. In 2023, Russia suspended its participation in the treaty. As Samuel Charap, John Drennan, and Julia Masterson from the RAND Corporation explain in a recent report,“there has been little to no bilateral dialogue between Moscow and Washington on strategic issues” since the Ukraine war (Charap et al. 2025, pp. 1–2). Trump’s apparent interest in improved relations with Putin’s Russia might at first sight offer new opportunities for arms control initiatives. In the RAND authors’ positive scenario, Russia and the US might continue to comply with central provisions of the New Start Treaty while pursuing negotia­tions for a follow-on agreement. The current treaty expires in February 2026. Other possibilities include reviving some aspects of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces(INF), for instance by establishing a moratorium on deployment of INF-range weapons in Europe. Finally, according to RAND, Russia and the US could“establish norms for mili­tary and security behavior in space”(Charap et al. 2025). It remains to be seen, however, if significant arms control initiatives will really take off even if Washington’s rap­prochement with Russia continues. In the past there were many obstacles to such initiatives. Some of these, such as Alliance considerations, may play less of a role for Trump in future. However, China’s nuclear rise and the trilateral arms control dynamic that it entails may still prove to be a major stumbling block. Mary Chesnut from the Center for Naval Analyses considers that US-Russian arms control might become less formalized and“may focus more on nu­clear risk reduction than on strict counting limits”(Chesnut 2023, pp. 36–7). Burden Sharing, Europeanization, and NATO’s Internal Adaptation There is a broad consensus in the US debate on NATO that Europe must step up its defense efforts. However, there are differing assessments concerning how(much) European states need to increase their financial and military contri­butions and what this means for NATO’s structure. Atlanticist-oriented commentators from both liberal and conservative corners have stressed the progress being made, especially the rising defense budgets of many Euro­pean allies since 2022 and their substantial aid contribu ­8 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.