lysts have shared the assumption that military support for Ukraine would eventually enable a peace that is last­ing and just. Few have spent much energy, however, on discussing details and a specific pathway toward that end or on describing the possible trade-offs and dilemmas associated with it. An article by Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan that was published in April 2023 in the Foreign Affairs journal(Haass and Kupchan 2023) was one notable exception. When it was published, Haass was president of the Council on For­eign Relations, while Kupchan was and is Professor of In­ternational Affairs at Georgetown University. Both argued that the Biden administration’s approach of“as long as it takes” with regard to weapon deliveries would not work and that Kyiv would not be able to reconquer all of its terri­tories. The two authors proposed to focus diplomatic ener­gy on a ceasefire, creation of a demilitarized zone, and a role for the UN or the OSCE to monitor such a ceasefire. Should Russia violate the ceasefire, the US and its partners would increase arms deliveries to Ukraine again. Haass and Kupchan also suggested a diplomatic process akin to the “2+4” format that paved the way to German reunification. In this model, Ukraine and Russia would negotiate directly concerning a permanent end to the war, while the US and NATO would talk to Russia about broader European securi­ty issues such as arms control. Instead of NATO member­ship, Ukraine would be offered long-term military and fi­nancial support to ensure it would be able to defend itself. At the same time, the European Union would offer Ukraine a clear prospect of accession. As Trump – first as presidential candidate and then as presi­dent – has promised to end the Ukraine war quickly, other commentators more closely aligned with the new adminis­tration also came up with specific proposals. A report by Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, published by the America First Policy Institute in April 2024, caused quite a stir. Keith Kellogg was subsequently appointed Special Envoy for Rus­sia and Ukraine by Trump(yet in March he was stripped of his Russia brief) and Fred Fleitz was a high-ranking official during the first Trump administration. Trump has been – and remains – rather nebulous about his “strategy” to end the war in Ukraine. Against this back­ground, many commentators and officials from the US and abroad took the paper as a guidepost on what to expect from a second Trump administration. Kellogg and Fleitz outline a strategy that echoes some of the central proposi­tions made a year earlier by Haas and Kupchan. In addi­tion, it emphasizes how lifting of sanctions against Russia and diplomatic normalization in the US-Russia relationship could serve as incentives for Moscow. Most recently, a team of analysts from the Quincy Institute published a report that also details a“diplomatic end­game” for the Ukraine war. The authors suggest broaden­ing the range of topics beyond Ukraine in order to achieve a breakthrough. For instance, the US and NATO could use their military posture in Europe as a bargaining chip. In that spirit, the United States could“expand or constrain its force posture in Europe depending on Russia’s willingness to compromise over Ukraine,” offer Moscow the prospect of returning to Western diplomatic forums or“play the China card.” The latter would entail offering Beijing a“significant role in postwar reconstruction,” a move that in the authors’ view would be a“powerful disincentive for Putin to violate the terms of a settlement”(Beebe et al. 2025, p. 2). Ukraine would in turn have to accept“permanent neutrality” out­side of NATO. It is an open question, however, if Trump will act upon any of the ideas raised in think-tank reports or even pursue a coherent strategy at all. What is obvious is that he prefers direct negotiations with Russia over the heads of Ukraine and other European countries. However, even then, it is far from clear that Trump follows the classical script of great power bargaining. If Trump succeeds in brokering an end to the war, Ukraine will need credible security assurances. As the new US administration is unwilling to provide these as­surances, this task will most likely fall upon the European part of NATO. NATO’s Engagement with the South The Alliance has long sought to engage“the South,” which has been defined in broad geographical terms to include the area from Western Africa and the Middle East to Cen­tral Asia. In 1994 it launched the Mediterranean Dialogue and ten years later the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (which includes several Gulf countries). NATO’s shift to­wards Eastern Europe following the Ukraine war does not mean that the Alliance has abandoned its interest in the South. Quite the contrary: a year-long reflection process was launched at NATO’s Vilnius summit in July 2023 on “existing and emerging threats, challenges and opportuni­ties” in its southern neighborhood. A group of experts was tasked by the NATO Secretary General to lead this reflec­tion process and to come up with specific recommenda­tions. One tangible result of this reflection process was NATO’s Southern Neighborhood Action Plan, adopted at the Washington Summit in July 2024. Moreover, the NATO Secretary General appointed, for the first time, a Special Representative for the Southern Neighborhood(NATO 2024). US think-tanks have also contributed to this debate, some­times inviting European analysts to write or contribute to reports on the topic. However, NATO’s engagement with the South did not raise the same level of interest in the US as the war in Ukraine and the alliance’s defense and deter­rence posture in the east. To the extent that the South has been debated, discussions revolved around the kind of en­gagement that NATO should seek. Somewhat simplifying, it makes sense to distinguish between threat-oriented and development-oriented approaches(reflecting broader de­bates about the security-development nexus). NATO’s Engagement with the South 11