Threat-oriented analysts tend to focus on specific security challenges that NATO needs to address, such as the Rus­sian and Chinese presence in Africa, terrorism, weapons proliferation, irregular migration, piracy and others. In this spirit, analysts such as Jason Davidson, Pierre Morcos, and Luis Simon refer to NATO’s“southern flank” rather than its“southern neighborhood”(Davidson 2024). From this perspective, the task is to seek“360-degree deter ­rence” that covers east, north and south, even if the deter­rence challenges vary from region to region.“While allies are strengthening their forward defense along NATO’s eastern flank, including by deploying additional forces and capabilities, securing the southern flank requires a different approach based on rotational maritime presenc­es in both the Mediterranean and the Black Sea”(Morcos and Simón 2022, p. 4). Those, by contrast, who adopt a development-oriented view urge NATO to look beyond operational requirements or military crisis management and to focus instead on the strategic political level(Gerspacher 2024, p. 146). For these commentators, the most important task is to build long-term and inclusive partnerships that take each part­ner’s interests and perspective seriously(Karp and Maass 2024, p. 7). A more holistic approach would aim to devel ­op state capacity and civic institutions in African and Middle Eastern states in order to create stability. As NATO remains primarily a military alliance, this approach neces­sitates closer cooperation with other institutions, such as the EU and the United Nations(Droin et al. 2024). In their CSIS report, Mathieu Droin and his co-authors welcome NATO’s recent“effort to move toward a demand-driven, cooperative approach that factors in‘local contexts’” (Droin et al. 2024). It is safe to assume that the new Trump administration does not share an interest in a holistic approach towards NATO’s southern neighborhood which, in any case, for most Americans smells a lot like“nation building.” The latter concept is largely discredited in both political camps after experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. With Trump’s decision to dismantle the US Agency for Interna­tional Development(USAID) and his deep aversion to multilateral organizations and international bureaucra­cies, the US is currently moving in exactly the opposite di­rection. If Trump takes an interest in NATO’s south at all, it will most likely be through the prism of fighting terror­ism as well as securing critical minerals and other re­sources. Even then, Washington will in all likelihood not pursue its narrowly defined interests through NATO. Summary Salience of threats Unlike all other NATO countries, the United States has had a global national security perspective. The US has defined security interests and entertained alliances or partnerships on a global scale. Since around 2015, the fo ­cus has shifted to great power competition with the fol­lowing order of salience: China, Russia, nuclear weapons, Iran, and North Korea. From 2022 to 2024, tensions in re ­lations with China and Russia were perceived in Wash­ington as very high, with a high to medium risk of war. Nuclear weapons have become even more salient from a US perspective as Russia has issued nuclear threats to­ward NATO and China has started significantly enlarging its nuclear arsenal. In contrast, security concerns that have been traditionally associated with“the South” or the“arc of instability” – state failure, transnational crime, terrorism – have receded further into the background. Under the new Trump administration, security concerns from“the South” have been narrowly focused on the US’ southern border and the topic of migration, policy areas in which NATO does not play a role. Trump has also initi­ated a significant policy shift vis-à-vis Russia, and it re­mains to be seen how this shift will impact the overall national security debate in the United States. Summarizing Predominant Responses Trump’s radical foreign and security policy shift has creat­ed a widening gap between official policy and public debates as reflected in think-tank publications. NATO’s value base as an alliance of liberal democracies has long been taken for granted by most analysts but is now seriously challenged by the most important Alliance mem­ber. In the 2022 to 2024 timeframe, deterrence-oriented views clearly dominated national discourse with regard to Russia(and China). In contrast, the second Trump ad­ministration is now redefining the relationship with Rus­sia and lowering the threat perception. There has been a broad consensus among US analysts that European allies will have to share a greater part of the defense burden on the European continent. Under Trump, demands are becoming more radical and the approach is less cooper­ative and more confrontational(pivoting from burden sharing to burden shifting). One question that still re­mains open is whether the US under Trump will also aban­don its hegemonic ambition in NATO and force Eu­ropeans to either create a truly European-led alliance or build defense structures completely outside of NATO. On Ukraine, US discourse has been shifting from support (even though it never was“all in” to begin with) towards “get out fast.” Since Obama declared the US“pivot to Asia” in 2011, it has become a shared assumption in both political parties that China is the most relevant challenge and competitor for the US. As a consequence, Washing­ton has put pressure on its NATO allies to take the China challenge more seriously and to adopt a more confronta­tional language and policy vis-à-vis the People’s Republic. Most US analysts do not expect NATO to assume a mili­tary-operational role in the Indo-­Pacific, however. Rath­er the idea is to relieve the US in ­the European theatre, allowing Washington to focus its conventional military resources on Asia. 12 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.