Politically, the Asia-Pacific region is characterised by considerable diversity, including strong democracies as well as closed and electoral autocracies. Currently, only four per cent of the region’s population lives in liberal democracies, and eight per cent in electoral democracies. By comparison, 47 per cent reside under electoral autocracies and 41 per cent under closed autocracies, largely due to China(Boese et al., 2022). Overall, the level of democracy in the region has declined in recent years to levels last observed in 1986. This decline is particularly concerning because democratisation has historically been considered instrumental in expanding access to public goods and services. Countries across South and Southeast Asia, for instance – Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines and others, have experienced democratic setbacks over the past decades, reflected in erosions of freedom of expression and media independence, increased censorship, and weakened judicial and legislative checks on executive power. Hong Kong, the Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, has similarly faced challenges to democratic governance and civil liberties. These regressions have been observed across both democratic and autocratic contexts, underscoring the region’s broader trend of shrinking civic space and rising authoritarianism. The World Bank classifies eight Asia-Pacific countries as conflict-affected or fragile(Hill et al., 2025), but this oversimplifies the region’s complex security issues. Historically, the region has been highly susceptible to conflicts rooted in riparian resource disputes, terrorism, and ethnic or religious tensions. Competition over scarce natural resources, such as water and arable land, has triggered long-standing disputes, particularly in transboundary river basins. The South China Sea remains a flashpoint for overlapping territorial claims involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. India and Pakistan continue to face heightened antagonism over Kashmir, marked by periodic military escalations and strained diplomatic ties. Similarly, Thailand and Cambodia have endured protracted disputes over border demarcation, leading to intermittent armed clashes. Internal conflicts include Myanmar’s violence after the 2021 military coup, humanitarian crises, and displacement. The Philippines’ Mindanao conflict reflects ethnic and religious tensions, although some peace progress has been made. Bougainville in Papua New Guinea seeks independence despite peace accords. Afghanistan remains unstable under Taliban rule, posing regional security and human rights challenges. The energy landscape remains dominated by fossil fuels, which account for 85 per cent of total energy consumption in the region. Over the past three decades, the Asia-Pacific region’s share of global CO₂ emissions has doubled, from one-quarter to one-half(UNDP, 2024b). Yet the region’s per capita and historical contributions to global warming remain limited. Although China and India are currently major contributors to global emissions, they remain far behind other industrialised nations on a per-capita basis. Per capita calculations are essential for understanding the fairness of global climate accountability, as they reflect individual-level contributions rather than aggregate national totals. The per capita greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions across the region vary widely, exposing stark inequalities in both responsibility and vulnerability. While the global average per capita emission stands at 6.7 tonnes, Asia-Pacific countries such as Brunei(37 tonnes), Mongolia(27 tonnes), and Australia(22 tonnes) are among the world’s highest emitters per person (Jones et al., 2024). In contrast, populous nations such as Pakistan, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal emit less than 3 tonnes per person(Jones et al., 2024), yet remain among the most climate-vulnerable due to their geography, limited adaptive capacity, and dependency on climate-sensitive sectors. It is also important to acknowledge the enduring impact of colonial legacies on emissions. Although India and Indonesia have recorded notable emissions growth in the post-colonial period, their historical responsibility remains relatively limited. According to Evans and Viisainen(2023), when adjusted for colonial-era dynamics—such as centralised decision-making and resource control by colonial powers— their shares of cumulative emissions decline sharply, with India at-15 per cent and Indonesia at-24 per cent. In contrast, former colonial powers like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom rank among the top historical emitters per capita, followed by Russia, the United States, and Canada. “Middle powers” 1 such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia have assumed growing influence in regional and global governance debates. Their diplomacy adds a layer of complexity to the region’s geopolitical landscape, as they often seek to balance their economic ties with China against their security and political partnerships with the United States and other Western actors. Through ASEAN, its 10 Southeast Asian economies play a vital role in fostering dialogue, economic cooperation, and regional stability. Despite pressures from the U.S.–China rivalry and rising tariffs imposed on member economies, ASEAN has largely maintained its relevance as a neutral convener and a key driver of regional development. In contrast, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC)—established to promote economic, social, and cultural development in South Asia—has struggled to achieve comparable influence or integration. Persistent political and economic tensions among member states—particularly between India and Pakistan— have repeatedly stalled collective action and undermined its effectiveness(Bhattarai, 2026; Majid, 2017 and Mukherjee, 2014). As a result, the bloc has found it difficult to translate its founding vision into tangible regional progress, standing in sharp contrast to ASEAN’s relative success in managing diversity and advancing regional cooperation. 1“Middle power, in international relations,[is] a state that holds a position in the international power spectrum that is in the“middle”—below that of a superpower, which wields vastly superior influence over all other states, or of a great power, but with sufficient ability to shape international events”(Britannica, 2025). CH 2: Current State Analysis 19