POLICY PAPER Hannah Rae Armstrong The EU’s renewed approach to the Sahel: putting principled pragmatism into action Reflections from the Sahel and West Africa Introduction In November 2025, the European Union adopted a renewed approach in the Sahel to preserve its engagement with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso 1 . The collapse of this part ­nership followed nearly a decade of EU-led security and development cooperation that was marred by a sharp in ­crease of insecurity and obstacles to development 2 . The countries now joined together in the Alliance of Sahel States(AES) lifted military rulers into power who withdrew from the regional bloc ECOWAS and turned towards other foreign backers, especially Russia. In late April 2026, insurgents’ critical offensive in Mali made it clear that Russian support had not shifted the bal ­ance of power in Mali’s favour. The security forces that seized power in the central Sahel are still struggling to de ­fend territory against the jihadist insurgencies now rapidly seeping across borders into the littoral states. Meanwhile, other metrics have dramatically deteriorated: democracy is disappearing; institutional and geopolitical borders are shakily being redrawn; civil society, civic freedoms, and rights are experiencing new lows. Europe, not prepared to walk away from a region it deems strategic to its interests, is wise to adapt its approach. An intentional resetting could produce a relationship more in line with the interests and values of both parties. This poli ­cy briefing, informed by a series of dialogue sessions host ­ed by the FES Peace and Security Competence Centre in 2025-2026 uniting civil society leaders, policymakers, and diplomats in Lomé, Cotonou, Dakar, and Abuja, formulates recommendations to concretize the principles of renewed European engagement with the three central Sahelian states and the coastal states of the surrounding subregion that are either affected by spillover, or at risk of it. 1 Validated in November 2025 by the EU Foreign Affairs Council. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14296-2025-INIT/en/pdf 2 In recent years, institutions aiming to address the need for improved security cooperation have multiplied, including the Accra Initiative, G5 Sahel, Multinational Joint Task Force(MNJTF), Nouakchott Process, Comité d’État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint(CEMOC), Unité de Fusion et Liaison(UFL), Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Ter ­rorisme(CAERT), ECOWAS stand-by force, AES joint military force. They have yielded few dividends: beyond the sheer oversupply of often-overlapping initiatives, political an ­tagonisms and financial shortcomings or dependencies largely curbed their potential. The EU’s renewed approach to the Sahel: putting principled pragmatism into action 1