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Between ambition and stalemate : lessons from the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation Process in Mali
(2015-2024)
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POLICY PAPER Mahamadou Diouara Between Ambition and Stalemate: Lessons from the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation Process in Mali(2015-2024) Summary The experience of the Peace and Reconciliation Agree­ment(APR) demonstrates that an agreement negotiated primarily among political and military elites, and support­ed by strong international mediation, cannot deliver sus­tainable outcomes without popular support, meaningful citizen participation, and strong national ownership by stakeholders. Beyond the quality of an agreements provisions, the suc­cess of a peace process depends on the sustained com­mitment of the parties involved, institutional continuity, and credible monitoring and implementation mecha­nisms. Future peace agreements in the Sahel must draw lessons from the shortcomings of the APR, including fragmented international mediation, excessive dependence on exter­nal funding, the exclusion of key stakeholders, and the disconnection between security issues and governance challenges. Peace processes should integrate security, de­velopment, justice, reconciliation, and citizen participa­tion in order to address the root causes of conflict. Introduction Signed in 2015, the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali(APR), born out of the Algiers process, was one of the most ambitious and high-profile peace efforts in the Sa­hel, given the scope of international mediation, its duration and the complexity of the crisis. Designed as a comprehen­sive response to the 2012 crisis, marked by the collapse of the state, the occupation of the north by armed groups and international military intervention, it aimed to reform Malis political framework around three pillars: reaffirming national unity through substantial decentralisation, promoting re­newed and inclusive governance, and fostering reconciliation through the reintegration of combatants and transitional justice. Yet, nearly ten years after its signing, the transitional authorities official repeal in January 2024 marked the fail ­ure of a costly, controversial process that had been largely stripped of its political substance. However, describing the APR as a mere failure would be analytically inadequate. For several years, the agreement also prevented a widespread resumption of clashes between the state and the main sig­natory armed groups in the north, whilst maintaining room for political dialogue. Between Ambition and Stalemate: Lessons from the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation Process in Mali(2015-2024) 1