Michael Dauderstädt* Conflicting Distributive Interests in a Deepening and Widening Europe: A Challenge to the Emerging Europolity T he recent split in Europe regarding its foreign and security policy and its Constitution distracts from potential conflict in the core arena of European inte­gration where decisions are made concerning the dis­tribution of wealth and income in the deepe ning and widening Europe. The emerging Europolity will have to manage these conflicts if populism and Euroscepticism are not to endanger the unification of Europe. European politics and EU policies affecting the distribution of wealth and income in Europe If there is one sphere where frustration with politics (“Politikverdrossenheit”) is stronger than in national politics, it is European politics. European elections are characterised by low voter turn-outs. European affairs have little value in domestic political life. The citizens seem simply to ignore Europe. They apparently think that it does not affect their daily lives in a way that merits deeper involvement. Rather fuzzy issues of na­tional pride and prejudice seem to stir up emotions more than hard economic interests. If further proof were needed, the Iraq crisis provided plenty: Europe is far from unified. However, the cleavage between the “old” and the“new” Europe may be a short-lived, transitory affair. The societies of the EU’s present and future member states – let alone their governments – have different preferences, values and interests which may be more fundamental and structural. That this has occurred in the field of foreign policy may be frustrat­ing but should hardly be surprising as foreign and se­curity policy is still a basically national competence. However, the core of the European integration pro­ject is the Internal Market with its framework of regu­lations and supporting common policies(agricultural, structural, commercial and competition policies), and Economic and Monetary Union, at least for the mem­bers of the Eurozone. Even in this core business of Europe, there are conflicting interests, some more ob­vious than others. Up to now, these conflicts arising from European integration have largely been latent and dormant. Political parties in Europe seldom take up European issues in a serious manner, with the ex­ception of such crucial questions as, for example, EU membership, 1 although most parties have more or less strong programmatic positions on European economic and political integration. 2 Even the election campaigns for the European Parliament are mostly dominated by domestic issues and general assertions of support for Europe. But the further European integration progresses, the more painful the adjustment pre ssures and costs are likely to become. The underlying conflicts could be­come more virulent and require attention from the European political system at all levels, in Brussels, in the member states, and on the regional and local lev­els. One(dangerous) scenario could be the re ­emergence of conflicts between nation-states as op­posed to a trans-national cleavage between basic po­litical options for Europe(for example, socialist vs lib­eral, or federalist vs intergovernmental). Unresolved economic conflicts could also spill over into and fuel traditional national/cultural conflicts. EU policies affect the behaviour of European states, households and enterprises in various ways. European integration has changed the competencies of states, the structure of markets, people’s rights and has even introduced a new currency, albeit not yet in the whole EU. Different EU policies affect different member states, and societal segments within member states, in various ways, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, * Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn; International Policy Analysis Unit. 1 While some authors(for example, Marks/ Wilson 2000) see European issues growing in importance for national parties, others see only a limited impact(for example, Mair 2000). These views can be reconciled if one assumes that party sys­tems shape party attitudes towards Europe rather than the other way round. 2 See for an overview Marks/ Wilson/ Ray 2002.