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Europe's strategic interests : the role of German foreign and security policy en route to European self-determination and global responsibility ; [text based on a speech at the 4th Willy-Brandt-Forum of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Brussels on March 29, 2007]
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BRUSSELS FOCUS EU-Office Brussels 38, rue du Tacitume B-1000 Brussels Tel: 00 32 22 34 62 80 Fax: 00 32 22 34 62 81 fes@fes-europe.eu www.fes-europe.eu Europe's strategic interests The role of German foreign and security policy en route to European self­determination and global responsibility Egon BAHR April 2007 EGON BAHR, born 1922, professor and former minister of the Federal Republic of Germany was, together with Willy Brandt, the architect of the policy of détente in the 1960s. He is the SPD's most important foreign policy mentor. This text is based on a speech he gave at the 4 th Willy-Brandt-Forum of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Brussels on March 29, 2007. Egon Bahr celebrated his 85th birthday on March 18 of this year. Europe does not threaten anyone, Europe is geared to stability; Europe has no enemies nor does it have any territorial aspirations. It could be a heavy­weight force, but Europe as a whole is still reluc­tant to accept its role as a global player. Germany should concentrate all its efforts towards ensuring that Europe becomes the fifth pole in a multipolar world. Discussions about our foreign and security policy interests are taking place in a favourable environ­ment; there is no current controversy to muddy the waters. No-one is expecting ground-breaking inno­vation on European issues until the political situa­tion in Paris and London has been resolved after the presidential elections and the change of leader­ship in the Labour party. On the other hand, we do not need to take account of the successors to ei­ther Putin or Bush, since no-one can say who they will be. Quick-fire solutions to the Kosovo negotia­tions are not in demand. This is therefore an al­most ideal starting point for an open exchange of views between people from the fields of science, government and policy. I mean openness in a dual sense of allowing new initiatives and arguments into the equation. I will attempt to justify my point of view and to distil it into a few salient points. There are three overriding factors which gov­ern the orientation of German foreign and security policy: America, Europe and Russia. In all this, I believe that the element of paramount importance is to establish clarification about our relationship with America. The reasons are simple: America is the only superpower, America is the leading power in NATO, and it is thanks to Amer­ica's credibility and steadfastness that the Cold War was brought to a satisfactory conclusion. We are linked to America through principles, some shared, some not. Without claiming that this is a comprehensive view, I would like to begin with the values we do not share. America's values include the death penalty, the right of private individuals to bear arms, the power of the president to declare war and deploy troops without the agreement of the nation's par­liament, a penal system primarily free of rights for the incarcerated where the state decides what constitutes torture and what does not, illegal kid­napping of foreign nationals and the refusal to allow US citizens to be placed under the jurisdic­tion of the International Court in The Hague. The USA's refusal to sign up to international treaties