­Or an exclusion, in principle, of any political consideration, which is manifested not only in the exclusion of political parties in the selection of members of the commission, but also in the demand for non-partisan affiliation of the members appointed into the commission The first choice appears more realistic since elections are the topic considered, which are of key interest to political parties; therefore, it seems logical that stakeholders in elections be represented in electoral commissions. In other words, it is assumed that nobody is better placed to organize and promote transparency in elections than those who are engaged in them. The disadvantage of this partiality can however be easily foretold. Opening up electoral commissions to political formations implies the risk of reproducing political rivalries within them. The arbitral function which suggests the staying aloof and absence of partiality is likely to be absent in this case. Obviously, this does not mean that people appointed by the political formations will automatically comport themselves in partisan manner, and neither is it obvious that political stakeholders, going by their particularistic definitions, will first of all be guided by neutrality. The second option – exclusion of any political consideration in the composition of the electoral commission – comprises the advantage of stretching the exigency of the independence of the commission to the very end, enshrining it in the statutory principle or the deontological principle. In that way, any suspicion of partiality or “politicization” weighing on the commission is far removed. The disadvantage of such a conception lies meanwhile in the fact that it does not ensure the expertise of the commission. By“expertise”, we mean at this point in time the mastery of electoral issues from the standpoint of political activism. This does not however mean that expertise in the management of elections is obtainable essentially 20