INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS The New NATO Strategy A Temporary Compromise CHRISTOS KATSIOULIS January 2011 The heads of state and government of the North Atlantic Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept at the NATO summit on 19–20 November 2010. The document drawn up by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen supersedes the Concept of 1999, which previously described NATO’s role and tasks. The 2010 Concept is intended to summarise the existing consensus of the member states and to introduce new approaches, without laying down a fixed schedule. It is intended to situate NATO – at least conceptually – in the new security environment. The core NATO tasks which it identifies are defence, crisis management and cooperative security. However, the Strategic Concept glosses over the sometimes fragile consensus between the member states and avoids definite positions on disputed points. Four disputed areas in particular stand out here, in respect of which the Secretary General’s document falls short of expectations or harbours the potential for future conflict: the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance, crisis management in relation to other actors, relations with Russia, which focus in particular on joint missile defence, and the question of defence funding in a period of financial and economic crisis. The new NATO strategy in this way postpones important questions for the Alliance in the coming years. Only with regard to cooperation with Russia are there constructive ideas for a long-term improvement in relations with the former adversary in the combination of the concept and decisions of the NATO–Russia Council.