Communal Violence in Indonesia: Implications for Democracy and the Role of the State by Dominic Berger Since 1998 Indonesia has undergone extensive political and social reforms, in many ways be­coming a more open and democratic society. Although this has undoubtedly been a positive development for Indonesia, this article will discuss some recent developments that have led some to question whether the country has indeed become a mature democracy. Inter­communal violence in several urban areas around Jakarta has sparked controversy over how the government is responding to the criminal actions of hardliner groups, such as the Front Pembela Islam(Islamic Defenders Front, FPI). As pressure is mounting on the President, the police and the local authorities to take firm action against perpetrators of any violence, mistrust and mob-justice are threatening Indonesia’s emerging democracy. Pluralism in Indonesia is officially embraced in its national slogan: Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or“Unity in Diversity”. While diversity and identity were highly state-managed affairs during the New Order regime, members of ethnic and religious minority groups saw the beginning of reformasi as a new era in which their identity and way of life would be pro­tected and valued within Indonesia’s new democracy. This article will look at a certain aspect of the resurgence of minority identity, namely the emergence of radical Islamic groups in several urban settings and their impact on Indonesia’s democratic develop­ment. As a country with both a democratic political system as well as a plural society, Indonesia holds a special place for those who hope that these two can function together. The political reforms that began in 1998, known as reformasi, led to a more open and demo­cratic government, in turn unleashing social forces that for years had been repressed under Suharto’s New Order regime. Amongst these social forces are pro­democracy groups, students, human rights groups, journalist associations and indepen­dent trade unions. While reformasi is usually associated with these pro-democracy groups, there is another side to a more open political system: the emergence of radical religious and ethnic empowerment groups, sometimes referred to as‘uncivil society’. 1 Increasingly, these groups are seen as an unintended, and undesirable, consequence of the end of Suharto’s authoritarian rule. Firstly, this article seeks to place religious violence in Indonesia into its current political context and secondly, it attempts to assess the risk of its possible impact on democracy in Indonesia. Historical Background Suharto’s authoritarian regime left little space for radical Islamic groups for actions that were not sanctioned by the regime. Any actions by non-state actors were considered a de facto challenge to the regime’s absolute claim on power, and were thus not allowed. As the New Order created the appearance of calm and stability in Indonesia’s plural socie­ty, the regime limited research and discus­sion of religious and ethnic issues. Today there is still a reluctance to properly examine the legacy of the past. As a result, there is a lack of detailed knowledge about the inci­dence of violence during the New Order pe­1 Zachary Abuza,‘Political Islam and violence in Indo­nesia’, Routledge, New York, 2007, pp. 1-2.