Figure 19. Distribution of educational attainment amongst supporters towards five party families in Western Europe. Social democrats Christian democrats Liberals percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Conservatives -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Populist radical right -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Population average percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Less than higher secondary Post-secondary Higher secondary University Moving on to age in Figure 20, we notice a similar picture. There is a minor trend over time of political party supporters becoming older. We primarily notice this by the increasing proportion of the 65+ group between the mid-1990s and today, as well as a decreasing proportion of the 25- to 34-year-old cohorts. The distribution of the other age groups remains relatively stable over time. Even more, there appears to be little to no differences between party families, thereby countering the argument that those favouring populist radical right parties tend to be older. 63 While this may be the case in absolute terms, our evidence, at least, shows this is not the case compared to other party families, or even the broader population. Here, it is important to remember that all West European societies are marked by an aging population, primarily due to an increase in life expectancy. 64 Therefore, the older cohorts simply carry more electoral weight, most notably because of their greater propensity to turn out and vote. 65 The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on(social) democracy 47