Figure 24. Distribution of socio-economic status amongst supporters for different party families in Western Europe. Social democrats Christian democrats Liberals percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Conservatives -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Populist radical right -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Population average percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 White collar worker Blue collar worker Self-employed Finally, turning to left-right self-identification in Figure 25, it is not surprising that those who position themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are also disproportionally in favour of the mainstream right as well as the populist radical right. For liberal and Christian democratic parties, we notice that that the distribution of political affinity is relatively in line with that of the population. For social democratic parties, two observations stand out. Firstly, those who consider themselves right wing hold – unsurprisingly – lower levels of support towards these parties. Secondly, those who consider themselves left wing are more willing to support these parties, yet – surprisingly – this is to a much lesser extent than right-wing citizens exhibiting an affinity towards the mainstream right or the populist radical right. This illustrates that social democratic parties have difficulties translating their voting potential into actual support and much of their potential remains untapped, perhaps even lost. 52 The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on(social) democracy