are becoming more dismissive of certain parties, but it rather ties into the overall trend of increasing levels of education across the population we outlined earlier. Figure 26. Distribution of educational attainment amongst voters rejecting different party families in Western Europe. Social democrats Christian democrats Liberals percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Conservatives -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Populist radical right -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Population average percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 -2001 1996 -2006 2001 -2011 2006 -2016 2011 -2021 2016 Less than higher secondary Post-secondary Higher secondary University As extant research shows, it is not far-fetched to suggest that growing levels of education across Western Europe seem to have fostered an important transformation, namely, from so-called allegiant citizens in the 1960s to more assertive citizens today. 83 Whereas the former tend to be politically passive, trust institutions and deferent towards authorities, the latter are characterised by an inclination to be politically active, distrust existing institutions and remain more sceptical towards authority. In other words, with higher levels of education come independent thinking, critical reflection and a more vocal expression of opinions – especially disapproving ones, for example, by rejecting social hierarchies. 84 All of these put citizens in a position where it becomes“easier”, or at least more common, to express feelings of dislike and rejection – something that in earlier times of extreme partisan dependence(like the 1950s and 1960s) was not necessarily the case 85 – or at least no longer align with political parties in stable and predictable ways. At the same time, it is worth noting that the link between higher levels of education and increasing rejection of political parties is particularly noticeable for the populist radical right and Christian democrats. It is not unthinkable for this to be related to the values promoted by these party families. After all, fewer people in 54 The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on(social) democracy