Looking at the gender distribution of citizens who reject the party families under consideration in Figure 28 further confirms the initial observations related to gender and support for different party families. We notice an almost equal 50/50 gender split between all party families and over time. There is no overrepresentation of men or women within particular groups of potential voters who reject certain party families. Although existing research tends to show the prevalence of male voters within the populist radical right, 86 the data discussed here suggests there is no evidence of a gender gap when it comes to rejecting the populist radical right over time in Western Europe. This is a notable finding and further highlights that some of the voter potential for all parties under consideration, even the social democrats, is not tied to a particular gender group. Figure 28. Distribution of gender amongst voters rejecting different party families in Western Europe. Social democrats Christian democrats Liberals percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -20 ­0 2 1 0 ­0 2 6 0 ­1 2 1 0 ­1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Conservatives -20 ­0 2 1 0 ­0 2 6 0 ­1 2 1 0 ­1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Populist radical right -20 ­0 2 1 0 ­0 2 6 0 ­1 2 1 0 ­1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Population average percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -20 ­0 2 1 0 ­0 2 6 0 ­1 2 1 0 ­1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 -20 ­0 2 1 0 ­0 2 6 0 ­1 2 1 0 ­1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Male Female -20 ­0 2 1 0 ­0 2 6 0 ­1 2 1 0 ­1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Looking at the income distribution amongst people who reject the different party families in Figure 29, we notice a relatively equal distribution amongst the five income quintiles, both within each party family and over time. Nonetheless, there are some modest differences that are worth pointing out. For example, we notice that the rejection of conservative and liberal parties is more prevalent amongst those with lower levels of income, something that it is probably related to the tendency of these parties to defend more restrictive welfare policies and oppose government intervention. 56 The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on(social) democracy