Figure 32. Distribution of left-right self-identification amongst voters rejecting different party families in Western Europe. Social democrats Christian democrats Liberals percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -20 0 2 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Conservatives -20 0 2 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Populist radical right -20 0 2 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Population average percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent of frecuency 0 20 40 60 80 100 -20 0 2 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 -20 0 2 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 Left Center Right -20 0 2 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 6 021 199 2 6 00 2 1 00 2 6 01 2 1 016 3.5 Comparative takeaways We started this chapter by outlining the extent to which citizens support and reject the five party families we set out to examine here. Most generally, neither support nor rejection of mainstream parties fluctuates much over time. That is not to say that their(potential) electorates are stable over time. As a matter of fact, we know they are not. Yet, it does mean that the extent to which people like and dislike mainstream political parties is not something that drastically changes. Consequently, there is not only a permanent pond these political parties actually fish from, but there are also potential ponds from which mainstream parties can fish – thereby leaving a good number of prospective votes untapped. This is slightly different for the populist radical right. Compared to its mainstream counterparts, we notice a relatively linear trend upwards for both like and dislike of the party family. In other words, while we see that more people come to like populist radical right parties, we simultaneously see more people come to dislike these parties. Interestingly, the latter trend is something more recent, which might be due to these parties becoming more visible and even participating in or supporting government in numerous West European countries(Austria, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands). An important implication of this latter observation is 60 The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on(social) democracy
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The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on (social) democracy
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