conservatives also insisted on the resignation of the FPÖ interior minister, Herbert Kickl, who was accused of interfering in investigations into right-wing extremist groups shortly after the new government had taken office. Evidently, the more moderate groups in the ÖVP saw the government reshuffle as an opportunity to get rid of Kickl, whom they regarded as a political liability. However, Kurz’s plan to form a short-term minority government of his ÖVP with some independent ministers until an early election failed. Following a vote of no confidence, a transitional government of experts was appointed, and new elections were held in September 2019. As a result of these events, the ÖVP pursued a dismissive strategy, trying to ignore the FPÖ and instead seek a new coalition with the Greens. The opportunity presented itself because, in the 2019 election, the FPÖ lost almost 10% of its voters, while the Greens achieved their best electoral win yet. The ÖVP had been in the best position to appeal to many disappointed FPÖ voters and, thus, improved on its already strong showing from 2017(from 31.5 to 37.5%). The People’s Party reckoned that they had little to fear from the right, as the FPÖ was internally divided and preoccupied with its own problems. In addition, the coalition agreement with the Greens ensured that conservative migration policy, which mattered to Kurz and the ÖVP greatly, could not be blocked by the Greens, so the conservatives would be free to find alternative majorities in parliament if the Greens were uncooperative. Unexpectedly, however, the Greens, who controlled some of the key ministries, often succeeded in pushing back against the conservatives. Leaked chat conversations pointing to the possible involvement of key ÖVP officials, including Chancellor Kurz, in political and public corruption, as well as an extensive investigation by prosecutors protected by the Greens justice minister, significantly undermined the ÖVP’s standing with the public. This, in turn, strengthened the leverage of the Greens, who in October 2021 threatened to leave the coalition if Kurz, who was facing a vote of no confidence, did not resign. The distinct prospect of a new government without the conservatives prompted the party to push for Kurz’s resignation first as Chancellor and then as party leader. The ÖVP foreign minister, Alexander Schallenberg, briefly took over the Chancellorship until the ÖVP subsequently elected Karl Nehammer as party leader(interim 2021, elected 2022) and Federal Chancellor(December 2021). In office, Nehammer followed an adversarial strategy of publicly attacking the FPÖ and its leader Kickl as unfit to govern, but, at the same time, continued to pursue an agenda designed to attract voters from the right. Summing up, the development of the People’s Party in recent years suggests that the liberal wing of the party has disappeared, and the Christian democratic profile has been weakened in favour of a more conservative orientation. Figure 33 gives an overview of the national election results(shares of votes) of all parties that have won seats in the parliament’s main legislative chamber since 1986. It also attests to the centrality of the ÖVP as the nearly perennial government party, as can be seen at the top of Figure 33 where all coalitions are displayed. 66 The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on(social) democracy