wing radicalisation. This leaves the constituent parties of Lewica – the New Left(Nowa Lewica, NL) and Left Together Razem – facing a dilemma. On one hand, the need to create a common front against radicalism has led to a situation in which social democrats are likely to enter power for the first time in nearly two decades, providing the left with the possibility to exert an influence disproportionally greater than its 8.6% share of the vote. On the other hand, the urgency of confronting illiberalism has resulted in social democrats coming under significant pressure to scale back their preferences for the sake of a common front. As the analyses of party positions in Figures 42 and 43 show, there are significant differences between PO and Lewica on economic policy, and between PSL(a constituent party of the Third Way coalition) and Lewica on socio-cultural policy. With both the ideological and numerical centre of gravity of Polish politics firmly on the right, the left risks alienating its already fragile support base. Indeed, following post-election negotiations, Razem soon decided not to join the governing coalition, citing insufficient commitment to its key policies in the coalition agreement. 293 While PiS’s turn towards a more economically interventionist policy platform has had the effect of shifting the mainstream in favour of social policies previously derided by the centre-right as impractical and unaffordable, there is limited scope for the left to be the main beneficiaries of this shift. Much of the more economically vulnerable electorate is still reluctant to vote for a party offering socially liberal policies, and while the stereotype of the modern Polish left as a coterie of prosperous urban radicals is an exaggeration, the party still lacks the“heartland” appeal that has enabled PiS to capture many of the voters the left might hope to mobilise through attacking neoliberalism. According to exit poll data, in October 2023, only 1.1% of those who voted for PiS four years previously transferred their vote to Lewica, and while 15% of those who did not vote in 2019 voted for Lewica in 2023, the coalition lost a greater percentage of 2019 left-wing voters to KO(23.1%) and nearly as many to Third Way(14.1%). 294 These figures underline the“squeezed” position in which Polish social democracy finds itself two decades after the beginning of its decline: the economic policies it needs to implement to increase its support base are likely to prove elusive in a party dominated by the centre-right, while the socially liberal cultural policies it has benefited from may be growing in popularity with the electorate, but are increasingly embraced by centre-right parties reacting against PiS’s shift to radical social conservatism. 7.5 Conclusions The radicalisation of the right has had profound implications, not only for the quality of liberal democracy in Poland, but also for the dynamics of party politics and the trajectory of future development. Although the ousting of PiS has been adduced as an example of how it is possible to fight back effectively against democratic backsliding, and although the fact that the opposition can defeat PiS is evidence that the situation is nothing like as parlous as in Hungary, the result of the 2023 election is very much a response to radicalism rather than its defeat. PiS built its support base by moving to more radical positions, has held onto that base, despite the evident exhaustion of its political vigour over the last couple of years, and remains the most popular single party in a relatively stable party system. As such, radicalism is not just a feature of Polish political life, but a defining characteristic of one of its main elements. This radicalisation has also spilled over into Polish public life more generally. Both radicalisation and the response to it have exacerbated existing tendencies towards polarisation, the effect of which has been to recalibrate norms of acceptable behaviour and interaction in the public sphere. Verbal aggression towards and demonisation of political and social“enemies” has been normalised, and the standard for judging 122 The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on(social) democracy