FES impuls Jana Faus, Horand Knaup Mistakes made – lessons learnt The SPD’s federal election success was not down to chance. AT A GLANCE In the wake of the disastrous 2017 federal election campaign, the SPD commissioned an external working group to analyse and reassess their cam­paign. What the SPD learnt from this and what the other parties’ strategists could have learned is discussed in this text. EVERY FEDERAL ELECTION IS UNIQUE Every federal election campaign has its unforeseeable peculiar­ities. The months leading up to the election were overshad­owed by the pandemic, which made it almost impossible to stage major events indoors. In addition, for the first time three par­ties put up a candidate for chancellor – a tribute to the fragmen­tation of party politics in the Federal Republic as well. And for the first time, a once-familiar duel between two candidates turned into a three-way fight, which initially became a duel be­tween Laschet and Baerbock, and then on the home straight once again reverted to a duel between Laschet and Scholz. In this extraordinary and volatile constellation, the SPD seemed to have no chance of reaching even the 20 percent threshold four months before the election. It was a party that had been written off, with a seemingly uninspiring candidate and rather pitiful popularity ratings, even in the social sphere, its traditional core competence. In the end, it not only crossed the finish line as the strongest party group with 25.7 percent, it surpassed the 2017 result by an astonishing 5.2 percent. The SPD thus turned in exactly the same result as in the 2013 federal election. LEARNING FROM MISTAKES One of the remarkable decisions made by party leader Martin Schulz in 2017 was to have an external working group review his own rise and fall in popularity among voters. While the results of“learning from mistakes” might not have been en­tirely flattering for him, in retrospect they helped lay the foun­dations for the SPD’s success four years later. Some of the recommendations from the paper, which were adopted by Olaf Scholz’s handpicked election campaign team, but also by the entire party leadership, are: • The party’s unity was unique – even in frustrating times that went on for months. Never before had the SPD managed to present such a united front during a campaign. This is especially remarkable given that the Geywitz/Scholz team had suffered a defeat at the end of November 2019 in the runoff against ­Esken/Walter-Borjans for chairpersonship of the party. The newly elected party chairs opted to not exercise their traditional right of first refusal to run for chancellor, however, instead agreeing to have Olaf Scholz stand as candidate. It is to the credit of the two party chairpersons and Secretary General Lars Klingbeil that they pooled their forces, held the party to­gether and swiftly addressed the party’s internal“healing process”. • The early naming of the candidate also proved extremely helpful. When Annalena Baerbock and Armin Laschet were billed as candidates by their respective parties in April 2021, Olaf Scholz had already been screened many times and thor­oughly analysed and discussed by the media – including his weaknesses. • There was a clearly defined strategic centre in the SPD sur­rounding the candidate. Campaign manager Lars Klingbeil or­ganised the election campaign around Scholz and ensured that work at party headquarters was marked by a spirit of cooperation. • The parliamentary party group and the state premiers were involved in formulating the party platform, but publicly kept out of discussions regarding its content. • The party leadership managed to package the election plat­form into a solid compendium void of the usual long-winded prose, keeping it short and concise(64 pages) as never before. • When the SPD performs weakly, it always has weak com­petency ratings in the social sphere. By putting the minimum Mistakes made – lessons learnt— FES impuls 1