The IMF Program vi) Transforming the flow of power sector payments arrears from positive to negative will be one of the most difficult targets to achieve. This is likely to be the case even more after the decision by the Government not to escalate power tariffs in coming months. Overall, there is a high likelihood that the majority of the performance criteria will not be met in September 2021 at the time of the combined sixth and seventh review. How will the IMF respond? Will it give a number of waivers as it did in the previous program from 2013 to 2016? There is a view that the attitude of the IMF may be influenced by extraneous developments. However, the country will have to pay a huge price by yielding to the regional security related demands of the largest shareholder in the board of the IMF, leading thereby to a softening of the Program. 19.4. Contingency Planning There is need for the Government to undertake an in-depth and objective assessment of the likelihood of the performance criteria and indicative targets being met in the seventh review of September 21. Attempts may be made to devise a strategy and identify specific measures to coming close to the maximum extent to the targets. However, there is need to prepare a fallback option and develop a home-grown strategy to meet the external obligations in the event the program is terminated by the IMF or Pakistan voluntarily withdraws from the Program, given its very high economic and political costs, especially in terms of a higher rate of inflation and unemployment. What could be the ingredients of such a‘home grown’ strategy? These are listed below. i) The external debt repayment in 2021-22 is estimated at$14.7 billion in 2021-22. The big repayments are$4.7 billion on Chinese project loans, largely as part of the CPEC,$2.6 billion to the Multilaterals,$4.4 billion to international commercial banks, mostly Chinese,$1 billion redemption of Euro/Sukuk bond and just over$1 billion to the IMF. The scope for roll-over of these repayments will need to be carefully explored. The likelihood is potentially higher in the case of Chinese project loans. This could lead to a deferment of over 31 percent of the liabilities. Chinese commercial banks could also be approached for some extension of the period of repayment of loans. ii) During the period of suspension of the IMF program and while it still exists on paper there should be a flotation of a Euro/Sukuk bonds in July 21. 189