Publikationen der Stiftung → The pre-vetting phases
Publikationen der Stiftung → The pre-vetting phases
Inhalt
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- Executive Summary
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- 1
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- Case Study 1. Vladislav Gribincea, President of the LRCM, warns: “Politicians could bulldoze into justice”
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- 2.4 Myth: “The system must be cleansed of the judges who failed to punish the Laundromat”
- 2.3 Myth: “The justice system is to blame for the fact that the billion stolen from the banks have not been returned”
- 2.2 Myth: “Citizens have more trust in the Government, the Parliament, and the President than in the justice system”
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- 2.6 Myth: “The system is resisting reforms”
- 2.5 Myth: “The Government allowed the judges to clean themselves first and they failed to do so”
- 2.7 New myths: “Justice should not be independent” and “International standards in the field of justice do not work in Moldova”
- Case Study 3. Member of the SCM, Ion Guzun: “The state needs to take responsibility for human rights violations. We have to accept that the judiciary is not independent”
- Case study 4. President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu: “International good practices in the field of justice reform have proved insufficient and ineffective for Moldova”
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- 3.1 Applicants
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- 3.2 Pre-Vetting Commission
- 3.3 Evaluation criteria
- 3.4 Appeal procedures
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- 4.1 Candidates’ responsibility for the situation and actions of persons considered “close” to them
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- 4.3 Placing the burden of proof solely on the candidate
- 4.2 Inaccessibility of evidence and unreasonable time limits for providing evidence
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- 4.4 Annulment of the power of the matter decided/adjudged, presumption of guilt, and double liability for the same act
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- 4.5 Retroactive imposition of non-existent obligations
- Case Study 6. Pre-Vetting Commission assigns non-existent obligations to candidates during their childhood
- Case Study 5. The Pre-Vetting Commission deviates from the methodology for verifying information about candidates
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- 4.6 Lack of substance of the candidates’ rights of defence
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- 4.7 Misunderstanding of the legal framework of the Republic of Moldova by members of the Pre-Vetting Commission
- Case study 8. A member of the Pre-Patenting Commission, Victoria Henley, suggests to the candidate-plaintiff that he recuse himself in his own case of challenging the decision of the Commission
- Case Study 7. The Pre-Vetting Commission considers that the assistance of the lawyer does not allow the representation and consultation of the candidate without the Commission’s permission
- 4.8 Self-regulation of the Pre-Vetting Commission’s activity exceeding legal limits
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- 4.10 Depriving the court of the last word
- 4.9 The illusory nature of the appeal
- Case study 10. Parliament’s Speaker Igor Grosu: “There should have been no possibility to challenge”
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- 4.11 Setting unreasonable deadlines for examining appeals and re-evaluating candidates
- Case study 11. Pre-Vetting Commission member Vitalie Miron: “Pre-Vetting has created a legal absurd”
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- 4.12 The discriminatory effects of the appeals procedure
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- 5.1 Extension of the Commission’s mandate
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- 5.2 Immunizing the Pre-Vetting Commission and Secretariat from prosecution
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- 5.4 Secretizing the Secretariat of the Pre-Vetting Commission and concealing political connections
- 5.3 Exclusion of the time limits within which the Pre-Vetting Commission carries out the evaluation of candidates
- Case study 14. International anti-corruption expert Tilman Hoppe compares the timeframes of external evaluation in Moldova, based on the example of the Pre-Vetting Commission, with those of the Ukrainian commissions
- Case study 15. Member of the Secretariat of the Pre-Vetting Commission, Nadejda Hancu, moved from the Secretariat of the PAS faction to the Secretariat of the Pre-Vetting Commission
- Case study 16. Member of the Secretariat of the Pre-Vetting Commission, Constantin Mitu, who went from being an advisor in the Parliament’s Legal Committee and advisor to the President to a member of the Secretariat of the Pre-Vetting Commission
- 5.6 Limit the grounds for rejecting appeals
- 5.5 Convening of General Assemblies of Judges and Prosecutors by the Minister of Justice
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- Pre-Vetting Commission to avoid the possibility of admitting appeals through the “Saturday Law”. The politician-members of the Commission
- 5.7 Metamorphosis of the status of the
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- 5.8 Destruction of evaluation materials – intention to cover up politically motivated crimes?
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- 6.1 Pre-Vetting development, promotion, and monitoring, trust of politicians, and potential conflicts of interest
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- 6.2 Substituting the Pre-Vetting Commission’s communication
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- Pre-Vetting Commission
- 6.3 Assuming the role of verification and database access functions instead of
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- 6.4 Pre-Vetting and the closed loop of justice reform
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- 7.1 Application of ethical integrity assessment criteria
- the Candidates’ Perspective
- 7.2 Application of financial integrity assessment criteria
- 7.3 Deadlines for responses
- 7.4 Gathering of information by candidates and the burden of proof
- 7.5 Interpretation of the information by the Commission
- 7.6 Candidates’ experiences perceived as humiliation, harassment and discrimination by the Commission
- 7.7 Candidates’ access to administrative file materials
- 7.8 Access to personal data
- 7.9 Self-recusals and recusals
- 7.10 Secretization of the Secretariat
- 7.11 Appealing the decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission
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- Integrity Doubts Regarding the Members of the Pre-Vetting Commission
- 8.1 Review of the requirements for the appointment of members of the Pre-Vetting Commission
- Case study 23. Pre-Vetting Commission member Tatiana Raducanu: assets and convictions at the ECtHR
- Case study 24. The Chair of the Pre-Vetting Commission, Herman von Hebel, with a dubious reputation, who was not checked by the Parliament before his appointment
- 8.2 Lack of reaction to members’ actions that compromise the Pre-Vetting Commission’s image
- Case study 25. Chair of the Pre-Vetting Commission, Herman von Hebel – incompatibility as member of the Pre-Vetting Commission and defiant refusal to resign on this ground
- Case study 26. Pre-Vetting Commission member Tatiana Raducanu resigns because of links with fugitive oligarchs Shor and Platon, invoked by the APO
- 8.3 Low duration of integrity of some members of the SCM and SCP, positively assessed by the Commission
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- Case study 29. Candidate Victor Sandu assessed negatively on the basis of the information submitted to the Pre-Vetting Commission by the SIS, in the absence of evidence that could confirm it
- Case study 30. Candidate Aureliu Postica prosecuted after the operational analysis was carried out by the NAC, at the request of the Pre-Vetting Commission, and the facts were not confirmed
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- 9.2 Pre-Vetting Commission’s double standards in assessing candidates’ integrity
- Case study 31. Presidency of the Republic of Moldova, prosecution on falsifications in the interest of a criminal group carried out against candidate Alexei Panis, concealed by the Pre-Vetting Commission
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- 9.3 Exceeding the limits for the re-evaluation of candidates by the Pre-Vetting Commission
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- 9.4 Non-signing of the Pre-Vetting Commission decisions
- 9.5 Humiliation and degrading treatment of candidates and their family members by the Pre-Vetting Commission
- Case study 34. Candidate Marina Rusu, mother of six children, forced to prove that she can support herself on state payments
- Case study 33. SCJ, explaining to candidates that the Pre-Vetting Commission can sign its decisions even with the sign of the cross
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- 9.6 The Pre-Vetting Commission’s dependence on the political factor
- Case study 37. Chair of the Pre-Vetting Commission, Herman von Hebel, support for the ruling party and the country’s President expressed in interviews for the Dutch press
- Case study 36. Candidate Veronica Cupcea, answers given through tears when asked by the Pre-Vetting Commission about the son who died shortly before the start of the evaluation
- Case study 38. Employees of the Parliament and the Ministry of Justice accessing candidates’ personal data during the evaluation
- Case study 39. MEDEL on political attacks on the judiciary and threats to purge judges by external evaluation
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- 10.1 Synchronization of the launch of the SCJ reform with the submission of candidates’ appeals. Chain of resignations from the SCJ
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- 10.2 The exceptional situation in the justice system and deadlines for appeals
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- Case Study 40. Minister of Justice Veronica Mihailov-Moraru: discussions at the SCJ during the examination of appeals
- 10.4 The fate of the magistrates who overturned the decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission
- 10.3 Pre-Vetting Commission’s infringements in assessing candidates
- Case study 42. Explanation of violations found by the SCJ when issuing 21 decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission
- Case Study 43. Prime Minister Dorin Recean, Chair of the Parliamentary Legal Commitee Olesea Stamate, and Moldovan President Maia Sandu accuse magistrates of annulling the decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission and promise to clean up the judiciary
- Case study 44. Magistrates who annulled the decisions of the Pre-Vetting Commission, triggering disciplinary proceedings
- Case Study 44. SCM, premature acceptance of the resignation of the Interim President of the SCJ, Tamara Chisca-Doneva
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- 11
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- 11.2 Benchmarks for checking the implementation of the Venice Commission’s recommendations when adopting Law 26/2022
- 11.3 Did the drafting and final adoption of Law 26/2022 take place after effective consultations with stakeholders and the opposition?
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- overall_conclusion1
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- 11.8 Have the rules on the adoption of the Pre-Vetting Commission’s decisions been adjusted?
- 11.9 Did the assessed candidates have access to a court of law?
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- 12.2 Scope of vetting. Evaluation criteria
- 12.3 Vetting structures
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