Publikationen der Stiftung → [The Abraham Accord] Titel
Publikationen der Stiftung → [The Abraham Accord]
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Titelaufnahme
- Titel[The Abraham Accord] : [the Israeli-Emirati love affair's impact on Jordan]
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It is hard to overlook Jordanian officials displeasure with the Abraham Accord. Explicit in Jordanian official statements released after the deals announcement is a firm conviction that there is no practical or acceptable alternative to the two-state solution. Unfortunately for Jordan, the new deal has the potential of weakening the decades-old Arab consensus reflected in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API).
That being said, Jordanian officials refrained from explicitly condemning the Abraham Accord. Perhaps Jordan sought to avoid a head-on confrontation with the UAE whose financial support Jordan direly needs. Nevertheless, Amman does have multiple options available should it think outside the box. First, Amman can discourage other Arab countries from taking the same step as the UAE. Such steps could include an emergency Arab League summit to confirm the API, effectively upstaging the UAE and prospect for further normalization.
Besides, Jordan can and should throw its weight behind efforts to unite Palestinian factions. A third tool available to Amman is its strong ties with its allies in the West, namely the US and the EU. If Jordan continues to invest time, effort and political capital in convincing the international community that a Palestinian state is a perquisite for peace, it can frame the UAE-Israel peace for peace approach as a gambit whose pursuit without solving the Palestinian question could lead to radicalization in the region.