“Negotiations in Cyprus about a solution of the Cyprus Problem are based on the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” this is a statement from the Joint Declaration of the leaders of both communities, dated 11 February 2014; by everything, what is meant is the six dossiers on governance and power-sharing, EU matters, security and guarantees, territory, property, and economic matters, which all together constitute the core of the Cyprus problem. A comprehensive solution, therefore, requires an agreement on all these issues.

Historically the aim for a ‘comprehensive settlement’ has been idealized and, indeed, in the opinion of the authors, it has become a trap. Since 1974, rounds of talks between the leaders have only led to agreements at the lowest common denominator – such as the 1977-79 High Level Agreements and more recently the Joint Statement. A drive for the “tightest” possible agreement obviously has the perverse effect of provoking resistance on both sides. This policy paper aims to contribute to the settlement efforts by offering a healthy measure of realism in the form of achievable concrete goodwill measures.