Russia: The Loneliness of an Aspiring Power Center DMITRI TRENIN S ince 2000, the foreign policy of the Russian Federation has gone through several stages. Up until 2003, Russia mostly moved toward rapprochement with the West under the slogan of»European choice« and with the aim of entering into an alliance with the United States. After that, until 2007 Moscow pursued a policy of nonalignment, with a pointed independence from the West, but combined with a reluctance to confront it. In his much-noted Munich speech, Vladimir Putin in effect laid out the conditions under which he expected to coerce America and Europe into partnership with Russia: accept us as we are, treat us as equals, and establish cooperation based on mutual interests. This»co­erced partnership« was never realized. In 2008 and early 2009, it became obvious that Russia was moving toward increased isolation from its would-be partners. If this trend prevails, there will be serious and peril­ous consequences, both for the domestic situation in Russia and for in­ternational relations overall. A year ago, the Russian leadership felt that it was in full control. It had succeeded in modifying the structure of the domestic political regime while fully preserving its essence. Economic growth, market take-off, and an influx of investment allowed the Kremlin to roll out ambitious strate­gies for the coming decade and a half. Even as the global crisis started to unfold, Russia was seen as an island of stability, and the ruble aspired to become the reserve currency for the huge area between the Eurozone and the sphere of the rmb . This area – the cis countries – seemed destined to become Russia’s sphere of attraction, the region of its privileged interests and its political, economic, military, and cultural preeminence. Beginning in 2008, restoring Russia’s»natural« historic position as the dominant power in central Eurasia – the policy option that had long been a»periph­eral« alternative to Western integration – became the focus of Russian foreign policy. This had previously been prevented by Russia’s»illusions« about the West, on the one hand, and by the lack of resources on the other. Now these illusions had vanished and resources had become available. 142 Trenin, Russia: An Aspiring Power Center ipg 2/2009