hammering away at state legislatures,and even Chambers of Commerce , toget them to back an increase in theminimum wage from forty to seventy-five cents an hour. By one argument oranother, including the one that withouta higher minimum industries are goingto keep on leaving New England , thelocals have lined up a virtually solidfront. The New Hampshire State CIOCouncil, headed by a Textile Workers'representative, finally got the NewHampshire Legislature to ask Con­ gress for a seventy- five- cent minimum.Edelman says this brought SenatorStyles Bridges into line.

This technique is also used by otherpressure groups, like the National Asso-ciation of Real Estate Boards, theAmerican Legion , and the privatepower companies.

Jackson

ackson doesn't spend nearly as muchtime as Edelman on indirect lobbying.He doesn't have to. The perfectly dis-ciplined platoon of Southerners re-quires no persuasion to exert itself onbehalf of the cotton industry.

Like so many other prominent pres-sure groups, the National CottonCouncil was not set up with lobbyingin mind. It did not even have a Wash-ington office until 1944. Its purposehas always been to increase the con-sumption of cotton, and Jackson's jobis to encourage government policiesand legislation to that end.

Just as Edelman has spent his lifeclose to the labor movement, Jacksonhas always been close to cotton. Hegrew up in the Mississippi Delta coun-try, and after a couple of years at theUniversity of Mississippi , took a jobin the county agent's office in Macon.Shortly after Oscar Johnston, a wealthyMississippi planter and cotton expert,organized the National Cotton Coun-cil in 1938, Jackson became its Missis­ sippi field director. Except for a coupleof years with a seed company in South Carolina , he has worked for the coun-cil in some capacity ever since.

Because Jackson is interested onlyin selling cotton, he usually operatesas a lone wolf, leaving the logrollingto the cotton bloc in Congress . Herarely approaches a non- SouthernCongressman, and knows only abouta third of the Southern delegation per-sonally.

Taking care of cotton is a compli-cated business, however, and Jackson

sometimes finds himself lobbying onforeign policy, minimum wages, oreven the Taft- Hartley Act.

The first great lobbying achieve-ment of the Cotton Council, beforeJackson came to Washington, was anamendment to one of the wartimeprice- control bills requiring that ceil-ings on cotton be based on parity, in-stead of market, prices. The passageof this amendment led PM to call theCotton Council" the most powerfullobby in Washington."

The council also has to its creditthe Research and Marketing Act of1946, which gave the government thejob of doing the cotton industry's re-search for it. The council originallyproposed the law because it didn't havethe money to carry on some researchit wanted done. The bill was broad-ened to include all agriculture, andpassed Congress without dissent.

This year Jackson has been con-cerned with repeal of margarine taxes,appropriations for the European Re-covery Program, and a new cotton-acreage- allotment system. He is alsoproud of an amendment he had in-serted in the Commodity Credit Cor­ poration charter, authorizing the trad-ing of surplus farm commodities tovarious foreign countries in return forstrategic and critical materials neededfor stockpiling.

Jackson at one time worked hard foreconomic aid to Spain because he saw

HAKE

an outlet for surplus cotton, but heran into too many objections from theState Department . He opposed theseventy- five- cent minimum wage onthe theory that it would put part of thecotton industry out of business. He alsoopposed repeal of the Taft- HartleyAct, especially its restrictive provisions

on secondary boycotts and jurisdic-tional strikes, out of fear that organizedlabor might consider boycotting South-ern textiles.

Like all other lobbyists, Edelman andJackson know that threatening Con-gressmen is an inefficient way of lobby-ing. A Congressman with a fair amountof experience knows just how power-ful each pressure group is in his homedistrict, and exactly what punishmenthe must expect from labor or frommillowners for an unfavorable vote.A Congressman also knows that, as ageneral rule, if he votes with the dom-inant economic interests in his districton the matters most important tothem, he can do as he pleases on every-thing else.

Jackson's lobbying is based on thepolitical power of a dominant eco-nomic interest. The Cotton Councilscrupulously avoids direct political ac-tion. It never endorses candidates forCongress .

But Jackson doesn't hesitate to lob-by in the second degree whenever heneeds to. Word to a prominent cottonginner, farmer, or millowner that hisCongressman is being contrary some-times brings results.

Edelman's capacity to persuade isbased on the voting power of organizedlabor, a force on which the CIO putsenormous emphasis. But the TextileWorkers' membership is largely in New England , and the textile industry isnow largely in the South . This givesEdelman a political problem he can'tfully solve until the CIO's Southern or-ganizing drive has accomplished a lotmore than it has so far.

Edelman counts on about ninety outof the 435 members of the House to beautomatically on his side on any issue.This group is composed largely ofNorthern Fair Deal Democrats. Someof these are one- or two- termers, whohaven't been in Congress long enoughto learn the ropes. Others are old- timerssent to Washington by the Democratic machines of Northern cities, and ofthese, particularly the New Yorkers,

The Reporter, October 11, 1949

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