Edelman says," The problem is not toget them to vote right, but to get themto stay in town to vote at all."

Surprisingly few of Edelman's de-pendable ninety Congressmen repre-sent districts where the Textile Workershave large memberships, but most ofthem come from places where otherunions, either CIO or AFL, are strong.This makes labor- lobbying a co- opera-tive project.

The Textile Workers Union is alsobeginning to find a few friends in theSouth whose support can be dependedon. Edelman can count them on hisfingers: Deane of North Carolina ,Lanham of Georgia, Sims of South Carolina , Boggs and Morrison ofLouisiana , and one or two others.

Jackson's rock- bottom strength inCongress is not substantially greaterthan Edelman's. It amounts to 110 or120 members in the House, and abouttwenty or twenty- five in the Senate .But this is a group with low turnoverand high seniority, and a facility forlogrolling equalled only by that ofsome Westerners- with whom the

Southerners frequently see eye to eye.A lobbyist's duties go beyond shep-herding votes on the Hill. Jackson, forexample, might want the Departmentof Agriculture to undertake a researchproject for the cotton manufacturers.He might be called on by the Com­ merce Department for information onthe cotton industry. Or he might wantthe State Department or the Economic Cooperation Administration to takesome action boosting cotton exports.And Edelman, in turn, finds himselfconstantly involved with the Nation-al Labor Relations Board, the La­ bor Department , and housing agencies.He even has business with the Justice Department , in connection with civil-rights violations in his union's South-ern organizing drive.

The tactics of lobbying are not cut-and- dried. The same man may be wel-comed in the Senate Office Buildingas an expert with invaluable advice tooffer, and be suspected in the Penta-gon of being a Five Per Center.

Laws are made by men who repre-sent, usually, a good many people. Butpeople have special interests, great andsmall. Some of their legitimate inter-ests are represented in Washington bymen called lobbyists, not all of whomare blackguards.-PAT HOLT

Trade

Devaluation Can't Do It All

DISTRIB

MARK- UP

When Sir Stafford Cripps announcedon September 18 that the exchangerate of the pound was being loweredfrom about four dollars to$ 2.80, hemaintained his usual dryly unoptimis-tic tone when speaking of the increasedAmerican trade that he hoped devalu-sterling nations. This lack of strongation would bring Britain and the othersterling nations. This lack of strongconviction about any great jump inAmerican overseas purchases after de-valuation is apparent in other Euro­ pean countries. Almost all of our would-be creditors feel that there's a lot moreto the problem of getting Americans to buy abroad than lowered currencyrates. Europeans insist that they havedone their bit toward inviting Ameri-can purchases abroad, and that weought to do much more toward invit-ing foreign goods here.

Most Europeans think it is stillAmerica 's responsibility to step up thetransatlantic flow of goods by reducingtariffs even below the levels achievedby the recently- renewed ReciprocalTrade system, by reforming customsadministration, and by contracting tobuy specific amounts of foreign mate-rials at predetermined prices.

DOMESTI

TARIFF

IMPORTED

the important moves now lie with us.The case of a French silk manufac-turer in Lyons illustrates one extremein the conflict. This manufacturer en-tertains his American visitors with aglass of wine, and a sad toast to his" museum" of silk samples, which, hesays, he can no longer sell in America because of our tariff. True enough, thetariff on French silks is high- fromthirty to seventy- five per cent, depend-ing upon the fabric. When questionedfurther, though, the Frenchman con-fesses that before devaluation his silkscost at least eighteen dollars a yard inFrance . At that price the Americanmarket for them would obviously benegligible, even if there were no tariffat all, transport were free, and import-ers and wholesalers had no markup.Nor will the Frenchman consider mak-ing cheaper silks, which the Americanmarket might be more interested in.His mill has always made what it makesnow, and he does not propose changingto suit the whim of the fickle Americanmarket, in which competition would befierce and profits low. He sells to theParisian couturiers and to rich French colonials; this market is small, but hisprofits are high, and in his stocks ofsilk he has some insurance against pos-sible further inflation. Actually, heis passive toward the American mar-ket.ket. Therefore his complaint abouttariff barriers doesn't hold much water.

It seems equally apparent to manyAmericans that it is up to the MarshallPlan countries to increase their sales tous by reducing their production costsand by learning how to fit their prod-ucts to the American market, as wellas by devaluing their currencies.In short, many Americans think the Consider, however, a product whose

initiative in increasing American im-ports lies largely with foreign sellers.Most Europeans remain convinced that

makers are desperately anxious to in-crease their American sales: French champagne. The problem of expand-

The Reporter, October 11, 1949

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