ties, for they are sure that, if a freeelection were held, the rightist factionswould be soundly repudiated.

According to law, Greece must votenext year, and there is no doubt that,like it or not, we are now the most im-portant political factor. Unless we dosomething to prevent them, the Greekrightists will drag us into the electionby maintaining that they alone candeliver American aid. By holding our-selves at a distance, we would tacitlysponsor the party in power, and wewould be represented by people whocould only discredit us.

The

he coming Greek election is a crucialone. Not only is discontent with thepresent government spreading anddeepening among Greek civilians, buta new and potentially dangerous ele-ment is about to enter Greek politicallife. As the civil war dwindles down tomere policing operations, a large per-centage of the quarter of a million sol-diers in the Greek Army will have to bedemobilized. Many of these young menhave been fighting first the Nazis , thenthe Communists , for eight or nineyears. A majority of them will return toimpoverished farms and villages. There,food and living conditions will bemarkedly inferior to the American-style diet and comforts they have beenenjoying in the service. Fascism hasthrived, in every country, onthe discontent of demobi-lized soldiers who could notadjust themselves to a life ofpeace.

Constantin Doxiadis, theliberally- inclined Director ofReconstruction, says:" TheGreek problem starts at themoment of demobilization.Our returned veterans willdemand a better livelihood and bettergovernment. We can't put these peopleaside by calling them fellow travelers.After all, they are the people whofought Communism . If we do not givethem improved conditions, they maylogically turn to violence- to anarchy,or to something else."

The Greek election in 1950 willlargely be determined by the characterof the pre- election government." If thePopulists do not control the electoralmachinery and policing," to quote aGreek conservative," they are washedup." All over Greece , people are nowdiscussing alternatives to the present

The Reporter, October 11, 1949

government. A strong- man setup, head-ed perhaps by General Papagos, is onepossibility that is mentioned often. Acaretaker government is another. Inthe first case, Greece would run thedanger of military dictatorship. In thesecond, there is the likelihood that apallid Premier would just be a stand-in for Tsaldaris, and leave the Populistmachine in control of the ballot box.Here is where the United States comesin again. In a poor country like Greece ,an election campaign is an extremelyexpensive business: Cars, newsprint,loudspeakers, and the rest of the para-phernalia cost money. If only one partyseems able to bring American assistanceto Greece , the people who can affordto support a political campaign willcontribute to that party.

The only feasible alternative to astrong- man government or a camou-flaged Tsaldaris government would beflaged Tsaldaris government would bea broad coalition, including represen-tatives of all the non- totalitarian par-ties. One seasoned political observersaid:" Get rid of the old political wheel-horses. There are younger men of realability in every party. Such men couldbe brought into a coalition Cabinet, ifthe Americans insisted that new menbe given a chance. The right- wing par-ties, the moderates, and the Socialists should all be included. It could bedone." Some Greeks and Americans done." Some Greeks and Americans

take a gloomy view of thechance for this sort of gov-ernment on the theory thatthere have been no outstand-ing political leaders in Greece since the elder Venizelos .Others maintain that a coali-tion seems to be the mostdemocratic alternative avail-able and, certainly, that itcannot be dismissed until ithas been tried.

Whether or not it is tried will bedecided not in Athens but in Washing-ton. This fact is far clearer to the Greekpeople, who are political realists, thanit is to Americans . The Greeks under-it is to Americans . The Greeks under-stand that any pre- election governmentformed in Athens will have to be eithertolerated or approved by the American tolerated or approved by the American Ambassador. If the Populists are per-mitted to run in our name, the Greeksmay vote for them on the principle thatit is inadvisable to shoot Santa Claus,or they may, in revulsion, abstain fromvoting to such an extent that Tsal-daris and his confederates will win

with a very small number of ballots.

If we allow ourselves to be identifiedwith the Populists , we will undoubted-ly see a repetition in Greece of whathappened in China - with the new, andquite insidious, twist that this Kuomin-tang will superficially seem to havebeen put in power by free democraticmethods. The way we can avoid this isto show that we endorse no singleGreek party, and we can do that onlyby using the influence that we unques-tionably possess in Greece to supportthe formation of a coalition govern-ment before the election.

We must intervene politically inGreece to the extent of making surethat the Greeks have a range of choiceamong several non- totalitarian parties,and of avoiding a stampeded electionthat would prove itself unrepresenta-tive of the will of the Greek people themorning after the balloting booths wereclosed.

In Greece and elsewhere, we arelearning that it is exceedingly difficultto promote democracy in a foreignland. We are learning- or, if not, weshall learn- that it is impossible to as-sume strategic and economic responsi-bility for a small exposed countrywithout exercising political influenceat the same time.

In Greece and elsewhere, the British have for a long time shown an aptitudefor winning allies and influencing gov-ernments, in line with British interestsand long- range objectives. They havealways recognized that they have tomake political suggestions, and theyknow when to make them. We can im-prove our technical skill in these mat-ters by studying how the British handlethem, but of course we cannot operatein precisely the same way because ourState Department has never been thepowerful, centralized institution thatthe British Foreign Office is.

Here in the United States , Congress and public opinion take a big hand;everything is done amidst loud and per-haps unnecessary proclamations; theTruman Doctrine itself provides thebest instance of this procedure. Thatis the way we go about things, and welike it. But it is time for the State De­ partment , Congress , and public opinionto make a decision about our stand inGreece , where, unwillingly and largelyunwittingly, we will, in a few months,be running for office.

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