Contemporary Constitutional Issues in our Multiparty Democracy what other part of the issue it is possible to try. However we look at it, these issues are not contemporary by any stretch of the imagination. They are issues that have been discussed, settled, experimented and decided on many years ago, and the changes in the environment in which they were considered and that need to take place before they are reconsidered have not occurred. The second point I am trying to make in this lecture is that the list of constitutional issues that we have making the rounds today are not issues at all. For example, we do not need to amend the Constitution in order to separate the Office of the Attorney­General from that of the Minister of Justice. The Constitution does not state that the Attorney-General needs to be a Minister of Justice. Thus, it is possible to appoint an Attorney-General and a Minister of Justice and establish protocols and conventions which ensure that the Attorney-General is not dismissed at will like any other Minister and that the procedure for vetting and approving the nominee in Parliament is thorough enough to ensure that an independent person of integrity is appointed as Attorney-General. To be brutally frank with you, all the issues I have heard of and read about relating to proposals for the amendment of our Constitution are a conspiracy by the middle and upper classes in Ghana to ensure that their already privileged and comfortable positions become even more comfortable. In this agenda, they are trying to foist upon us an illusion that the Constitution needs to be amended in particular respects and railroad us as willing participants into their agenda. 5 Let us take the example of separating the Office of the Attorney-General from that of the Minister for Justice. How does that help the common woman who is prosecuted by a police officer, if she gets the chance to be prosecuted at all, before being pushed into Nsawam Prison to await trial for fourteen(14) years. The common woman does not benefit from such a constitutional amendment. What that amendment seeks to do is to ensure a bourgeois arrangement, where the political class, after pillaging national resources or mismanaging them, are ensured of an impartial exercise of prosecutorial discretion by a non-politicized and independent 5 Justice G. L.Lamptey, Ten Years of Constitutional Rule in Ghana 1993-2003: An Overview. IEA Governance Newsletter, (July, 2003); Osagyefo Amotia Ofori Panin Okyehene, Ten Years of Constitutional Rule in Ghana 1993-2003-Chieftaincy Matters, IEA Governance Newsletter,(September, 2003); Justice Dixon Kwame Afreh, Special Agencies Under the 1992 Constitution, IEA Governance Newsletter,(June, 2003); Justice D.F. Annan, Ten Years of Constitutional Rule: 1993 to 2003, A Decade of Continuous Constitutional Practice-Perspectives from Parliament, IEA Governance Newsletter (August, 2003); Samuel Kyei-Boateng, Chief Welcomes Proposed Amendment of Constitution, Daily Graphic, Monday, December 1, 2008, p. 55. 12