4 OECD and the EU will be pressing for ratification as has been the case for the BEPS MLI. 6 This political pressure will probably affect developing countries that did not sign the Statement, especially if their audits feature high-profile digital companies under the Significant Economic Presence legislation or other so-called unilateral measures. The present working paper aims to provide G-24 policy makers with design elements that can address specific concerns raised in the context of the mandatory and binding mechanisms to be agreed in the Multilateral Convention for Amount A and the issues related to Amount A. The possibility of requesting design features that benefit developing countries is essential for producing a more stable solution that will capitalize on the opportunities and reduce any medium- and long-term negative impacts for those countries that will decide to join. This will also be important for countries that will not be immediately bound by the mechanism, but that may join later on without the possibility of modifying the design. The OECD proposal on dispute resolution so far 7 The OECD Secretariat has been working along with some developed country delegates to establish the general framework for tax certainty in Pillar One, maintaining the privileges of administering the procedure, as it did for the MLI.8 The Secretariat has envisioned two separate mechanisms: a mandatory binding dispute prevention and resolution mechanism for Amount A and a mandatory binding dispute resolution mechanism for issues related to Amount A. The Statement made no specific mention of the issue of costs for both types of mechanisms, and it seems that the issue is still undecided. However, G-24 countries must bear in mind that the default cost allocation mechanism in the MLI is that each country bears its own participation costs and that countries share common costs equally.9 Dispute prevention and resolution for Amount A The Pillar One Blueprint published in October 2020 contains the main design elements for the dispute prevention and resolution mechanism that will define the amount, the paying entities, and distribution of Amount A for every MNE within the scope that wishes to obtain early tax certainty.10 It is important 6 Oei, Shu-Yi, World Tax Policy in the World Tax Polity? An Event History Analysis of OECD/G20 BEPS Inclusive Framework Membership(September 6, 2021). Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 47, 2021-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918499(last accessed on 21.2.2022) 7 This section was prepared based on public information available, as well as information from two interviews conducted with two members of the OECD Secretariat during October 2021. 8 The power of the seat is reflected in procedural decisions. For example, under the MLI part VI rules, if arbitrators cannot agree on a Chair for the panel,“the appointment will be made by the highest-ranking official of the Centre for Tax Policy and Administration of the OECD that is not a national of either Contracting Jurisdiction”, that is, Mr. Pascal Saint Amans, unless France is involved in the dispute.(MLI Explanatory Statement, at 237). This choice has been criticized even by developed country authors(See Ault, Hugh(2021), Tax Treaty Arbitration: A Reassessment. In Kofler,G., Mason, R., and Rust, A.(Eds.) Thinker, Teacher, Traveler. Reimagining International Tax. Essays in Honor of H. David Rosenbloom. Amsterdam, IBFD. P.32.). 9 MLI Explanatory Statement, at 254. 10 OECD(2020), Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Report on Pillar One Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/beba0634-en. Paragraphs 17-19.(last accessed on 21.2.2022)