6| M AZARR & F IOTT posture on the progressive left for some time, and it is likely to return to the forefront once the current crisis over Ukraine ebbs. These views remain a distinct minority for the time being, but the 2022 midterm elections could see a new influx of many members of Congress uninterested in traditional US foreign policy commitments and thus willing to withdraw from traditional, long-standing alliances. Few expect the midterms alone to radically alter the course of US foreign policy, though getting congressional assent to further large-scale Ukraine aid bills could become more complicated for the Biden administration. But the trend is running against consistency in US policy, a trend that could be accelerated depending on the results of the 2024 presidential election. The current supportive and relatively stable US posture, one increasingly open to some forms of independent European security efforts, could give way to something far more unpredictable. Autonomy – a concept smothered at birth? The debate on strategic autonomy within the EU has undergone significant change among institutional actors and politicians. While the Covid- 19 pandemic, AUKUS and the unceremonious departure from Afghanistan blew new wind into the sails of the concept of strategic a utonomy, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have ensured that there is little ti me to expend on theoretical debates. In any case, some can successfully argue that the EU is now practicing the logic of strategic autonomy by delivering lethal equipment and weapons to Ukraine while also lowering its dependency on Russian fossil fuels 6 . Uncharacteristically, the EU has been relatively quick in agreeing to several rounds of sanctions packages on Russia, even at considerable short-term cost to the European economy. T he support the EU is providing its Member States to welcome millions of Ukrainian refugees should also not be forgotten, nor the fact that the EU has boldly bestowed candidate status on Ukraine while it is still at war. An alternative view, of course, is that EU strategic autonomy in defence has proven shallow and the response has only solidified the US position as Europe’s ultimate security guarantor. This can be seen in the vastly higher levels of US equipment being shipped to Ukraine when compared to Europe, as well as the post-Madrid defence reinforcement measures in Europe (which includes a permanent base in Poland, 300 000 troops on high alert and four additional ballistic naval destroyers based in Rota, Spain). This is not even to mention the fact that the EU will gradually end its dependence on Russian gas for supplies from the US, Qatar, Norway, Algeria and others. This is a necessary, if challenging, geopolitical move that has exposed the frailty of the EU’s(and certain Member 6 See Steven Blockmans,(ed.)‘ A Transformational Moment? The EU’s Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine’.