I t has become unpopular in public debates on both sides of the Atlantic to take a ‘realist’ stance on the Russia-Ukraine war. This is because the most vocal realist pundits can be described as‘neorealist’, who believe there is an urgent need to halt the war before it spirals out of control. Believing in the need to cut a deal with Russia, they tend to question the wisdom of open-ended arms deliveries to Ukraine. The unpopularity of neorealist foreign policy pundits is warranted insofar as their exclusive focus on the risk of escalation makes them blind to both Russia’s imperial intention and the significant Western interest in defending the long-standing European (and worldwide) principle of non-aggression. These factors give Western countries a convincing case for continuing – and perhaps upscaling – their support for Ukraine. B REAKING DOWN THE NEOREALIST ARGUMENTS Several examples of neorealist commentaries deserve mention by way of introduction. One line of argumentation is that the danger of escalating against a nuclear power that will become increasingly desperate if it were to lose the war urgently requires a negotiated settlement(or, at least, to lay the groundwork for the difficult questions to be negotiated in the future). Another is that the provision of assistance should be manipulated to bring Kyiv to the negotiation table because the US from a global perspective has little interest in border changes inside Ukraine. A third argument is that finding a settlement is in the interest of preventing the emergence of a Sino-Russian alliance that actively seeks to challenge Western hegemony. The fourth and perhaps most controversial neorealist voice(John Mearsheimer) blames Russia’s aggression on NATO’s supposed intent to make Ukraine a member of the alliance and warns that the absence of a willingness to compromise would only lead down a perilous path of escalation that could lead to nuclear war. To put the commentaries into perspective, we must clarify what defines‘neorealism’ as a paradigm of realist international relations theory. Neorealism arrives at foreign policy explanations predominantly or solely from the structure of the international system, namely the balance of power between states. According to neorealists, states find themselves in an anarchical system where they cannot trust the intentions of other states. Because states can only rely on themselves for survival, one can expect them to choose war as an option to prevent the emergence of a strong counter-coalition. Russia’s behaviour in the face of a competing military alliance encroaching on its border is no exception – since Russia has a vital interest in | 1