revenue/exports was greatest. Based on the latest expert assessments of the potential frequency of pandemics, the stress test could involve simulating a shock comparable to COVID-19 occurring once in each decade. DFI has recently been including the GDP and revenue impact of COVID-19 as a“stress test” in analysis of social sector(especially HIV response) financing prospects conducted for UNAIDS and covering Sub-Saharan African countries, and has found this relatively straightforward(Hurley and Martin 2024). As emphasised in section 3.2, it would be preferable for all of the inequality and pandemic spending costs and financing reactions(including what are now seen as predictable regular pandemic shocks) to be included in one scenario, rather than separating them, but it may be that for technical or messaging reasons they need to be kept separate. 5. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations This paper has examined how the Debt Sustainability Analyses conducted by the IMF and World Bank could be adapted to take more account of the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030. It has looked first at the case for making such adaptations, made even more urgent by the need to help IMF and World Bank member states to prioritise national spending(and ensure that its financing does not compromise debt sustainability) in the post-COVID context of polycrises and limited global concessional funds. In particular, the paper emphasises the vulnerability of all countries across the world to two urgent crises: the climate emergency(and related risk of nature collapse and natural disasters); and extreme inequality and poverty, which have been worsened by COVID-19 and are undermining growth and stability. The paper next looked at existing efforts to include the SDGs in debt sustainability analysis. It found that this had been done successfully by many countries during the period of the Millennium Development Goals, in countries such as Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Tanzania, and that there already exist many building blocks which would make such inclusion possible(notably agreed estimated global costings and methodologies for country-specific costings for all of the SDGs). Nevertheless, it underlined that in the current“polycrisis” period, with only seven years to go to reach the SDGs, integrating the spending needed to reach all of the SDGs into the DSFs would simply produce a conclusion that virtually all countries would have unsustainable debt levels. As a result, it will be essential for countries to prioritise which SDGs they wish to include. The paper identifies the two greatest threats to debt sustainability(but also the greatest potential opportunities for growth and greater debt-carrying capacity if we combat them successfully) as being the dual crises of climate and nature emergency, and extreme inequality and poverty. It therefore recommends that the international community should focus on prioritising the adaptation of the DSFs to these issues, while ensuring that countries have flexibility to prioritise particular sectors within these areas. The paper next examined progress so far in adapting the SRDSF to forecasting long-term scenarios related to climate change adaptation and mitigation, as well as including natural disaster“stress tests” in its methodology to examine the impact of natural disasters in both the SRDSF and the LIC-DSF. Overall, these are major steps forward to including SDG13 in the DSA methodology, which provide a clear framework for how similar work could be done on other SDGs. However, the paper raises criticisms and suggests ways to improve this work in terms of broadening country coverage; calculating spending needs more accurately and(given the urgency of climate crisis action) including them in forecasts from year one of the projection; including the potential positive impact of just green transition spending; combining the multiple impacts of climate into one scenario; including the other environmental goals to prevent nature collapse; linking up the implications of climate-adapted DSFs to other IMF processes such as indicative spending floors and country lending eligibility; and giving more weight to climate module results in overall DSA risk assessments. Series: Debt Sustainability Assessments& Their Role in the International Financial Architecture 13