IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VENICE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS OF LAW 26/2022 ON PRE-VETTING It was important that those consultations recommended by the Venice Commission should not be a formality, but should pro­vide a real opportunity for the views and concerns expressed by the opposition to influence the decision-making process. Therefore, when emphasizing the need for adequate consul­tations, it is suggested that the authorities should pay attention to and take into account the perspective and feedback of stake­holders and opposition in the drafting and adoption of the law. In the case described, it can be seen that the bill was voted exclusively by the parliamentary majority, represented by the ruling party. Voting against the bill and the absence of the op­position at the plenary session where the bill was voted on may indicate that their concerns and views were not taken seriously or that the consultation process was not transparent and fair. from the constitutional authority. In fact, the CC focused on other issues of constitutionality concerning Law 26/2022, which is apparent from the content of Decision No. 9 of 7 April 2022. Therefore, the issues of consensus, transparency, and the ap­proach to dialogue between the majority and the opposition, which were requested by the Venice Commission, were more formal than substantive. 11.4 Does the situation in the Moldovan judiciary create a sufficient basis for subjecting the members of the SCM to an extraordinary integrity assessment? On 14 March 2022, Law No. 26/2022 was promulgated by the President of the Republic of Moldova. According to Opinion No 1069/2021, the Venice Commission noted that: The lack of proper consultation between the parliamentary majority and the opposition is further demonstrated by the following two examples. On the one hand, in contrast to the above case, we recall that Law No. 120 on amending the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova(judicial system) was passed by 86 out of 101 MPs following a broad consensus between the parliamentary faction ‘Party of Action and Solidarity’ and the parliamentary faction of the Bloc of Communists and Socialists. In that case, there was a clear parliamentary consensus, whereas in the vote on Law 26/2022 such a consensus was clearly lacking. On the other hand, on 22 March 2022, Vasile Bolea, at that time a member of the parliamentary faction of the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, lodged a complaint with the CC for a constitutional review of Law 26/2022. In the grounds of the complaint, the author referred to paragraph 9 of Opinion No. 1069/2021. Moreover, at the public hearing on 7 April 2022, the author of the complaint was represented by lawyer Maxim Lebedinschi. According to the transcript of the hearing, the lawyer noted that: “The Venice Commission warned that for such a measure there must be a broad consensus at both parliamentary and societal level, including with the involvement of the SCM. The Commission emphasized that it is not enough to have a firm majority in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, and the adoption of such a law must be voted with the parliamenta­ry opposition. So far, we do not have a broad consensus on this law. Moreover, the law has also been criticized by spe­cialized associations in the field of justice, as well as by public associations. 266 However, those objections remained without a clear answer “13. The Venice Commission and the Directorate General have previously expressed the view,[…]. At the end, it falls ultimately within the competence of the Moldovan authorities to decide whether the prevailing situation in the Moldovan judiciary creates sufficient basis for subjecting all judges and prosecutors, as well as members of the SCM and SCP, to extraordinary integrity assessments.[...] 42.[...] it falls ultimately within the competence of the Moldovan authorities to decide whether the prevailing situ­ation in the Moldovan judiciary creates sufficient basis for subjecting all judges and prosecutors, as well as members of the SCM and SCP, to extraordinary integrity assessments.” The Venice Commission noted that the sole reason for con­ducting the pre-vetting process was the following: “10.[…] In the Information Note it is pointed out that this‘is an essential condition for increasing the confidence of society in the judicial system, as well as for the proper functioning of these institutions.” In reality, the Parliament did not put forward any other argu­ments than those mentioned above. Specifically, the execu­tive and legislative branches of state power have used only political arguments to interfere in the work of the judiciary. For example, in the case of Croatia, the Venice Commission (Opinion No. 1073/2022(CDL – AD(2002)05), 21 March 2022) examined the introduction of the procedure for the renewal of the security control by amending the Law on Courts. It stated that: “18. As far as the authorities refer to recent‘individual, high-pro­file cases of frequent inappropriate contacts and behaviour of judges’, it seems that this concerns a quite limited number of cases which are currently subject to disciplinary and criminal 266 CC sitting, min. 7:00-8:18; link: https: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvsigtrDpO4 97