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China's international development cooperation : history, development finance apparatus, and case studies from Africa
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The Chinese Aid System Academy for International Business Officials(AIBO) The Academy for International Business Officials(AIBO) co­ordinates and manages all Chinese foreign aid training pro­grams and implements portions of the training in-house. The range of training topics offered by China to other coun­tries is very broad, covering in 2021, for instance, women and children in the UN 2030 Agenda, railway and manage­ment, urban rapid transfer systems management, water conservation and irrigation in agriculture, public health management, traditional Chinese medicine, occupational safety, media, inter-bank cooperation, aviation safety, in­formation and communication technologies, e-commerce, air pollution governance, and Chinese culture. While train­ings took place in person before the pandemic, either in Beijing or in partner countries, they have been held online since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. 798081 In addition, the AIBO also trains MOFCOM staff seconded to the Economic and Commercial Counsellor Offices in Chinese embassies and consulates abroad, whose portfoli­os may include the supervision of foreign aid projects and Chinese foreign investment. Department of International Trade and Economic ­Affairs(DITEA) The Department of International Trade and Economic Af­fairs(DITEA) serves as the contact point for UN agencies and bilateral economic and technical cooperation donors and is the focal point for trilateral development coopera­tion projects. Traditionally, the department was responsi­ble for coordinating multi- and bilateral technical assis­tance to China. When DAC donors phased out bilateral aid to China and started approaching China for trilateral coop­eration, DITEA retained its function as the focal point, even though it is not involved with China's own foreign aid. The MFAs Department of African Affairs hosts FOCACs Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee. The last FOCAC Summit took place in Dakar, Senegal, in December 2021. Traditionally, the Chinese foreign ministers first trip abroad in the new year is to Africa. From January 9 to 16, 2023, merely weeks after assuming office, the Chinese For­eign Minister Qin Gang visited Ethiopia, Gabon, Angola, Be­nin, and Egypt, as well as the African Union Headquarters. Chinese Embassies and Consulates Chinese embassies and consulates serve as focal points for recipient country governments, conduct policy reviews for prospective projects, and oversee the implementation of ongoing projects. Chinese ambassadors are empowered to decide discretionary fund spending for smaller aid projects (around USD 50,000). Foreign aid reports are signed by the ambassador and sent to MOFCOM, MFA, and CIDCA through each embassy. Embassy representatives rarely participate in donor coordi­nation rounds in recipient countries a point that has of­ten been criticised by Western donors. Official responses from China often highlight theSouth-South nature of Chinese aid and describe donor coordination rounds as not recipient-driven, thus drawing a line between China and DAC donors. However, there are also other, more prag­matic reasons for non-participation: Embassies are often understaffed, with foreign aid being only one of many of their tasks and usually not accorded a high priority. 82 Their function in relation to foreign aid is more political, so they are not expected to have aid-specific knowledge or exper­tise in development cooperation. Moreover, unlike their DAC donor counterparts, they have no autonomy to make authoritative decisions in the field and must coordinate with MOFCOM, MFA, or CIDCA on almost all issues. 83 Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA) In terms of Chinese foreign aid, the Ministry of Foreign Af­fairs(MFA) task is to ensure that aid policy aligns with(and does not contradict) Chinas overall foreign policy. While the MFAs influence on Chinese aid was limited before the 2018 reform, it has since become an influential player in Chinas in­ternational development cooperation. This is not only re­flected in the fact that CIDCA reports to State Councillor Wang Yi, who is also the Foreign Minister, but also in the ap­pointment of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Luo Zhaohui as the new head of CIDCA in April 2021. The MFA may suggest new aid projects to CIDCA, but the final say lies with CIDCA. 79 Madrid Morales, D.(2018). African News With Chinese Characteris­tics: A Case Study of CGTN Africa. Doctoral Thesis, City University of Hong Kong, 15 June. https://scholars.cityu.edu.hk/en/theses/the­ses(e86f5b04-454d-4dea-a8f0-b1ae48624802).html 80 Schluntz, K.(2020). The Chinese Governments10,000 African Vil­lages Project in Two Mozambican Villages: Kung Fu, Confusion and Flags. The China Africa Project, 22 May. https://chinaafricaproject. com/analysis/the-chinese-governments-10000-african-villages-proj­ect-in-two-mozambican-villages-kung-fu-confusion-and-flags/ 81 Wasserman, H.& Madrid Morales D.(2018). How Influential Are Chinese Media in Africa? An Audience Analysis in Kenya and South Africa. International Journal of Communication 12, 2212–31. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/7809/2355 Ministry of Finance(MOF) The Ministry of Finance(MOF) drafts and manages Chinas national budget; therefore, foreign aid plans drafted by CIDCA need to be accepted by the MOF and integrated in­to the budget. Foreign aid project proposals need to be circulated to the MOF for approval. In terms of direct for­eign aid funding, the MOF covers the gap between the commercial and concessional interest rates for China Exim Banks concessional loans. In theory, the MOF is responsi­ble for loan policies, drawing up the framework agree­ments, and determining the interest rates of concession loans. However, in reality, the MOF appears to defer these responsibilities to CIDCA and China Exim Bank, only sign­ing off on loan agreements in order to approve the budget. As the responsible party for Chinas budget, the MOF also oversees Chinese bilateral debt cancellations and debt rescheduling. 82 Zhang, D.(2020). A Cautious New Approach: Chinas Growing Trilat­eral Aid Cooperation. Canberra: ANU Press, 250. 83 Zhang, D.& Smith, G.(2017). Chinas Foreign Aid System: Structure, Agencies, and Identities. Third World Quarterly 38(10), 2330–2346 (2333). https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1333419 19