Labour in Chinese-Financed Infrastructure Projects “dormitory labour regime”, namely the provision of ac­commodation and food at the worksite as a form of“social wage”. In Africa, this practice stoked dissatisfaction, as it was perceived as an instrument of control due to nominal­ly lower wages. Low labour costs also come at the expense of occupational health and safety, with Chinese companies not being well-versed in work safety procedures. The Chi­nese state forbids independent trade unions and does not provide legal or constitutional protection of the right to strike, so Chinese companies never needed to develop competencies vis-a-vis labour concerns or learn how to en­gage in social dialogue. These internal dynamics, which easily give rise to labour abuse, are important to under­standing labour relations in Chinese companies in Africa. Nevertheless, the local labour regimes of the host coun­tries also play a role. According to the Building and Wood Workers’ Internation­al(BWI), the global union federation grouping free and democratic unions with members in the building, building materials, wood, forestry, and allied sectors, decent work is the largest issue within Chinese companies 189 mainly due to following prevailing practices: – Subcontracting. Chinese construction companies regularly hire local subcontractors for labour-intensive tasks. According to BWI, about 10 per cent of the work, primarily management, remains with the Chi­nese company. This way, Chinese companies are also outsourcing their responsibility for workers. – Short-term contacts or no contracts. Most workers do not have permanent contracts. Although the pro­ject may be scheduled to run for three years, workers may be offered contracts for three months or even three weeks; it is also common that workers are only employed on a daily or hourly basis. Often, workers don’t have contracts at all. With short-term or no con­tracts, Chinese companies avoid social fees and social responsibilities. – Payment below minimum wage. Even in countries where a minimum wage exists, Chinese companies sometimes pay below the minimum wage. – Occupational safety. According to BWI, Chinese companies often do not comply with occupational safety and health requirements. For example, they pro­vide workers with poor quality one-size-fits-all work clothes and shoes. In Ghana, trade unions went after a Chinese employer in November 2022 for not issuing available personal protection equipment to workers. It is very difficult to hold Chinese companies accountable for occupational safety and health violations. Many countries do not have labour inspectors, or if they do, they lack the resources necessary to enforce labour standards. 189 Interview with a BWI representative. – Sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is prevalent at construction sites. In 2017, 400 Ugandan workers work­ing for China Railway Seventh Group 190 went on strike in response to sexual advances by the company managers, who withheld pay for those who did not comply. 191 In Lesotho, female workers went public with cases of sexu­al harassment by their Chinese supervisors at the con­struction company Qingjian Group 192 after local authori­ties refused to pursue the case. 193 However, many workers do not report sexual harassment for fear of vic­timisation and job loss. – Barriers to unionising. There have been unfair dismiss­als of workers who joined unions, with complaints that disciplinary and dismissal procedures were not followed. – Language barrier and intercultural conflicts. Ac­cording to BWI, when approached by trade unions, Chinese managers may pretend that they don’t speak English, even if workers have heard them speaking English on other issues. Violations of local laws and regulations are not something that the Chinese government condones, per se. On the con­trary, investment guidelines of the Chinese Ministry of Com­merce urge companies to“abide by local laws and relevant in­ternational standards”, including on labour rights protection and to“avoid bribery activities”. 194 However, these guidelines are voluntary and have little effect when economic interests meet weak rule of law and legal institutions with high levels of corruption. 195 In addition, the sheer distance from Beijing means that there is little possibility for state control over Chi­nese companies operating abroad. Thus, the voluntary nature of policies may be related to the Chinese state’s perception that it has no capacity to enforce them, as well as to an insuf­ficient political willingness to change the status quo. 196 190 subsidiary of the SOE China Railway Group Ltd.( 中国中铁股份有限 公司 ) headquartered in Zhengzhou, Henan Province. 191 gandan Workers Strike Alleging Sexual Harassment by Chinese Builder(2017). Global Construction Review, 4 January. https://www. globalconstructionreview.com/ugandan-workers-st7rike-alleg­7ing-sex7ual/ 192 ormerly known as Qingdao Construction Corporation. It was a state­owned enterprise until 2015. 193 okhethi, S., Kabi, P.& Ntaote, B.(2022). Chinese Company Doing Road Project in Lesotho Accused of Human Rights Violations – ACRP. Africa China Reporting Project, 8 March. https://africachinareport­ing.com/chinese-company-doing-road-project-in-lesotho-ac­cused-of-human-rights-violations/ 194 Ministry of Commerce(2019). Guiding opinions by MOFCOM and 19 other departments on promoting high-quality development of overseas contracting( 商务部等 19 部门关于促进对外承包工程高质 量发展的指导意见 ), 29 August. http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zc­fb/a/201909/20190902900658.shtml 195 iu, B.(2021). China’s State-Centric Approach to Corporate So­cial Responsibility Overseas: A Case Study in Africa. Transna­tional Environmental Law 10(1), 57–84. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S2047102520000229 196 S. , Chow, L., Huang, Z.& Yue, J.(2021). Understanding and Mitigating Social Risks to Sustainable Development in China’s BRI: Ev­idence from Nepal and Zambia. ODI Report, April. https://odi.org/en/ publications/understanding-and-mitigating-social-risks-to-sustain­able-development-in-chinas-bri-evidence-from-nepal-and-zambia/ 37