5. Strategic enablers: mobility, training, medical and cyber Geography makes the Western Balkans a land bridge tying the EU core to both Ukraine and the Eastern Mediterranean. For that reason, military mobility—and the dual‑use infrastructure that underpins it—features prominently in the regions development plans. The 2024 revision of the TEN‑T Regulation extends the core network to the Western Balkans, but significant segments still require construction or upgrades to military standards, and procedural frictions at borders persist. EU funding for military mobility in 2021–27 has thus far failed to include South‑East Europe, despite clear strategic logic for a southern corridor toward Ukraine. Countries in the region are moving nonetheless. Albania is financing a dual‑use port at Porto Romano and has inaugurated NATO’s first regional air base at Kuçovë; plans to revitalise the submarine base at Porto Palermo are under discussion. Corridor 8, linking Durrës on the Adriatic to Varna on the Black Sea via North Macedonia, is a flagship dual‑use endeavour with obvious value for supply‑chain resilience. On training, North Macedonia’s Krivolak range hosts large multinational exercises and offers a platform for rapid readiness activities; Serbia’s Pasuljanske Livade and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Manjača provide additional training capacity through the PfP framework. Kosovo, backed by the US and UK, has established a cybersecurity training centre for defence institutions intended as a regional hub. Medical support is anchored by the Balkan Medical Task Force in Skopje, a role‑2 multinational unit designed for crises and disaster relief, aligned with NATO standards. Fit with the EU’s Readiness 2030 priorities The 2025 White Paper on European Defence(Readiness 2030) translates the industrial and capability push into specific priority tracks. Four of these map directly onto Western Balkan strengths. First, Europe’s objective to produce at least 2 million large‑calibre artillery rounds annually underscores the need to mobilise every credible source of capacity; regional plants that already mass­produce 155mm shells and compatible Soviet‑calibre ammunition can help close the gap. Second, artillery systems themselves—where several Western Balkan manufacturers have proven designs and agile production lines—offer scope for cooperative investment and licensing to lift output quickly. Third, drones and counter‑drone systems: while high‑end combat Unmanned Aircraft Systems(UAS) will remain the province of larger Original Equipment Manufacturers(OEMs), the region is well placed to scale affordable Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance(ISR) and loitering munitions—areas where rapid iteration and cost control matter. Fourth, mobility and logistics: building a resilient southern supply artery to Ukraine through Balkan corridors would diversify risk, relieve pressure on hubs further north, and demonstrate European responsibility for sustainment. On the demand side, fiscal rules have been temporarily eased under the RearmEurope initiative, enabling member states to increase defence outlays. With fourteen governments signalling use of this flexibility, European industry will be stretched. Structured partnerships with Balkan suppliers—particularly SMEs and mid‑caps—can augment capacity and integrate them into EU supply chains, provided procurement and certification pathways are opened and predictable multi‑year contracts are available. Politically, the new Security and Defence Partnerships that the EU has signed with Albania and North Macedonia since late 2024 create a general framework for closer involvement, including potential contributions to the Rapid Deployment Capacity. To matter operationally, these frameworks require translation into concrete projects, slots in missions and exercises, and access to funding windows. Given the likely long duration of any post‑war peace support effort in Ukraine, even modest troop contingents from each Western Balkan partner could be meaningful in enabling rotations and sustaining tempo. Bridging enlargement and defence policy Defence and enlargement have too often proceeded on parallel tracks. If the EU wants to harness the region’s defence value, gradual integration into specific security and defence instruments should start now, tied to clear benchmarks on rule of law, public procurement integrity and CFSP alignment. In practice, the Commission can open pathways in industrial, procurement and funding domains where qualified‑majority voting applies, while member states retain unanimity on operational deployments and can pilot deeper bilateral or mini‑lateral cooperation, including through the EDA. A helpful template is the Single Market conversation that needs to expand to security and defence. The Letta report highlights an“integration deficit” in this area; as the EU builds a common market for defence goods and services, inviting the Western Balkans into the ground floor would both expand the supplier base and give candidate countries tangible economic stakes in alignment. Early participation in standards, certification and joint procurement would accelerate acquis adoption and reduce border frictions that currently slow military mobility and defence trade. 5