2. The dominant message Hungary’s drift to authoritarianism – under way since 2010 and now in its mature phase – began with taking control of the press, developing its control over the econ­omy and society and radicalising by repressing dissent. And this is especially effective when this shift is not quickly checked – i.e. the EU’s failure to crack down on Orban’s autocratic tendencies, resulting in a full-flown epidemic via which Viktor Orbán’s action plan has been exported. A case in point is Robert Fico’s return to power in Slovakia: the Slovak leader(whose SMER party refers to itself as social-democratic) has made used of Orbán’s consultants as well as close contact with the man him­self. There are many reasons behind this closeness – proximity to Moscow, Hungary’s interest in having a sup­porter on the European Council after Donald Tusk replaced Mateusz Morawiecki in Poland – but what the direction taken by the Hungarian and Slovak leaders really shows us is something else as well: a shift to authoritarianism is dictated not solely by the drive for ever greater power and control but, above all, by the fear of losing it. As compared to the man who governed Hun­gary in the late 1990s, the illiberal Orbán of the post-2010 autocratic shift differs for one reason only: the fact of having lost power in 2002. Fico similarly lost power in 2018 when he was forced to resign in the wake of the protests following on from the assassination of a journal­ist, Ján Kuciak. There is no need to point out here that Donald Trump, whose authoritarian tendencies were already clear – is a previous occupant of the White House and himself lost the presidency in 2020. It is not simply a hunger for power, but the fact of hav­ing lost it, which triggers illiberal tendencies: a desire not simply to rule a nation but also to remodel it, acting on its press, judiciary, culture, economy and politics. The first step in an illiberal plan such as this is attempts to control information and thus the public discourse and opin­ion. In this respect Budapest has much in common with Bratislava, and they both share a great deal with Rome. In 2024 Italy joined the World Press Freedom Index’s ‘problematic nations’ club – which Orbán is a member of. The following year, Italy’s ranking in the 2025 index fell further to 49th position. “Meloni has tangibly reduced press freedom,” reported Pavol Szalai, head of the EU Reporters Sans Frontières office. Attacks on press freedom, an increase in the use of gag­ging orders by politicians against those investigating them and, to an even greater extent, the changes under way in public broadcasting have all set alarm bells ring­ing for a series of freedom of information bodies, united in a task force(Media Freedom Rapid Response made up of the European Federation of Journalists, the Interna­tional Press Institute, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Article 19 Europe and Osservatorio Bal ­cani e Caucaso Transeuropa) which carried out an urgent Italy mission in 2024. The report which followed on from this was emblematically entitled Silencing the fourth estate: Italy’s democratic drift(“Silenziare il quarto stato: la democrazia in bilico in Italia”). Its conclusions make clear that attacks on press freedom are a common first step taken by leaders with illiberal tendencies, with the terms used being“intolerance by the governing coalition to any form of press criticism”,“a serious reduction in freedom of expression” and“weakening of democratic quality.” A further common feature of governments with illiberal leaders is portraying awkward journalists as enemies of the nation:“Meloni, Fico, Orbán, they’re all doing it,” argues Beata Balogová, the multi-award winning director of Slovakia’s most important newspaper, SME, herself the target of attacks by the Fico government. “Controlling broadcasting is a key ­element in this. Fico has been quite open about this: the role of journal­ists is not to monitor those in power but to report the good things they do. Initially the government thought in terms of a law which was to set up a body tasked for all intents and pur­poses with assessing public service content, i.e. censuring it. When the EU bridled this was removed from the draft law but Fico had no difficulty all the same in taking control of the public broadcasting service. This has always been subject to political con­trol, but now it’s a full blown govern­ment propaganda department, fol­lowing the prime minister’s orders. ­An example is pro-Ukrainians being called warmongers.” 4 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.