consensus among NATO members regarding the budget share of the above categories, with Personnel taking the largest part, about 50%, then 30% and 20% for O&M and Equipment respectively and a minimal share of about 1% to 3% for Infrastructure. Structurally, defense programs are organized in two parts: nonfinancial(activities and materials by quantities and years) and financial(corresponding funds per each planned activities/materials). An analysis of the AAF MBP during 2019–2025 5F 6 shows that its seven major programs are made up of 237 subprograms, namely: Planning-Management-Administration(9 subprograms), Combat Forces(84), Combat Support(91), Military Education(17), Civil Emergencies,(17), Medical Support(14) and Military Social Support(5). Appendixes 1 and 2 provide a more synthesized view(tabular and graphical) of the major MBP programs for the period 2019–2025 as planned over the respective years. Unfortunately, due to the lack of reliable data, it was not possible to include an analysis of budget execution here. Nevertheless, some important conclusions might be drawn despite such methodological limitations. As shown in Appendix 1, 42.4% of defense funds are allocated for the Combat Forces program, showing the importance of this component within the AAF. This is also graphically shown in charts 1.a and 1.b(red column). Within this program, 25.7% of the funds are allocated for Equipment(exceeding the optimum); however, a more in-depth look reveals some problems. Thus, as seen in charts 2.a and 2.b, a steep increase was planned starting in 2022. Consequently, the equipment-related budget allocated in 2022 was 33.4% higher than 2021, while in 2023 they were 89% higher than 2022. There is a slight decrease of such funds in 2024, to increase again by 6.6% in 2025. Even though the figures for 2024 and 2025 are still aspirational(waiting for government and parliamentary approval), the execution of budgets at such an increasing pace would constitute real challenges even for more consolidated organizations. As past records show, the gap between planning and execution has been a constant concern for the AAF. Thus, even in the sensitive years 2008 and 2009 (Albania’s invitation and accession to NATO), defense budget execution was around 80% but for Equipment, this number fell to around 50% of the plan 6F 7 . Further, as seen in Appendix 1, after Medical Support, the Combat Forces program provides the lowest percentage of funding for Personnel and O&M activities, respectively 21.3% and 19.1%, which is clearly anomalous(compared to the agreed-upon NATO funds’ threshold of respectively 50% and 30% for these budget categories) and will be elaborated below. Following its content, the Combat Support program should be titled Combat Service Support because, conceptually,“combat support” is related to all units/services that provide support related to artillery, air defense, engineering, nuclear, bacteriological and chemical(NBC), communication, reconnaissance& intelligence, 6 Albanian MBP, at https://financa.gov.al/programi-buxhetor-afatmesem-ne-vite-2/. 7 Due to the author’s positions in the AAF, he was deeply involved in the MBP process during 2006–2012, and was well informed on the budget execution problems of that time. BUILDING AND MAINTAINING OPERATIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN ALBANIA IN THE FACE OF CURRENT AND EXPECTED SECURITY CHALLENGES | 5