markets and cause capricious redistribution... As an alternative, mandatory saving schemes may be privately and competitively managed, in which case, there are likely to have fewer distortions...(WB, 1994: 18, 202, 234, 241). Reforms “reduce the operational expenses of the new private pillar”(Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2005: 235). b. Reality Freedom of Choice between the Public and Private Systems Structural reformers claimed that the benefits of the private system together with the freedom of choice promoted the opting out by insured individuals from the public system, which seemed to be ratified because an average of 82% of total contributors in the ten private systems was in the private system/ pillar in 2007(before the re-reforms of Argentina and Bolivia). But this change was caused, in part, by legal provisions detached from the goodness of the private system that: forced all the insured to change systems in three countries (Bolivia and Mexico to the private system and Costa Rica to the mixed system); increased the contribution to the public system or introduced incentives(such as salary increases) for prompting the transfer in three countries; divided the insured by age and required that the youngest switch to the private system in six countries, 54 and forced new workers to join the private or mixed system in seven countries(Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay). In the parallel models of Colombia and Peru, choosing between the private and the public systems was allowed. Employers decided for themselves or pushed their employees to switch systems in Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The transfer was encouraged by reformers’ promises, enhanced by publicity of better pensions, lower administrative costs, and immunity from 54 In El Salvador, insured individuals over 50-55 years old stayed in the public system and those under 36 years old were forced to switch to the private system; only middle-aged(36 to 50/55 years) insured had the option to choose between the two systems. In the Dominican Republic, insured under 45 years of age had to switch to the private system and those over that age were given a choice. In Panama, the oldest insured stayed in the public system, while the younger ones had to expressly choose to switch to the mixed system. In Uruguay, it was submitted to the age and income of the insured to stay in the public system or switch to the mixed system. 79