g) Imposing strict measures to prevent senior state officials and autonomous agencies(such as pension superintendencies) from accepting positions on the AFP board of directors(for example, disqualifying them while they are in office and for certain period of time after ending their jobs); h) Restricting excessive profits by the AFP and disproportionate payments to their managers and directors; i) Publishing comparative indicators on the AFP performance, in a simple and understandable way, in the media so that the insured can make an informed selection; j) Increasing competition among insurance companies for disability and survival risks and ensuring that there is no collusion between insurance companies and the AFP; another alternative is to take the coverage of such risks back to the social insurance institute, as in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico(upon prior research of the efficiency and cost of both alternatives); k) Encouraging the creation of insurance companies that offer annuities; l) In Bolivia, the new government should advance the date for the Public Manager to take over the AFP duties, set in the constitution and laws, and m) In Chile, the advisory board and the commission of users should more accurately assess the impact of the reform on fees and premiums. 9. Restoring Social Representation in the Administration Workers are the owners of individual accounts, but they have no repre­sentation in their administration in the private systems/pillars(as occurs in the public systems/pillars) or in the superintendence; therefore, it is recommended to: a) Establishing that workers have representation on the AFP board of direc­tors and creating a committee of affiliates in each AFP(as proposed by a law in the Chilean congress); b) Creating advisory boards with representation of workers and employers in order to advise the superintendencies and setting in them a unit for the protection of affiliates(proposed re-reform in Colombia); 217