L ESSONS LEARNT The ability of the EEAS to fulfil its mission depends not only on the clarity and shared articulation of its purpose within the EU external action machinery(section 2), but also on the ensuing trust and cooperation from the other protagonists it is supposed to serve and support (3.1), as well as the appropriate allocation and deployment of resources to that effect(3.2). The very conception of the EEAS triggered fears of both the re-intergovernmentalisation(or even the re-nationalisation) of communitarised external action, and the supranationalisation of CFSP/CSDP, generating suspicion and curbing appetite to provide it with the appropriate means to thrive. Looking back at the first ten years of its existence, the report identifies trust- and asset-related weaknesses and sheds light on possible ways for the EEAS ultimately to deliver (better) on its threefold tasks(section 3.3). Strengthen trust and cooperation Within the EEAS The blending of cultures that the merger of Commission and Council external relations services into one Service was meant to generate, ultimately leading to a European(geo)political mindset, has not yet fully materialised. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, High Representative Javier Solana had already tried to overcome the civil/military partitions by creating a single intelligence analysis capacity, which is essential for decision-making. Since the creation of the Service, successive HRVPs have regularly tweaked the organigramme to try and adapt the EEAS to changing realities, and to foster an esprit de corps. Yet, partly as a result of the 2010 Council decision on the EEAS, the distinct institutional cultures have remained and even ossified. The EEAS is in effect caught between an aspiration to build an esprit de corps, which requires a certain autonomy, and the constitutional reality within which it has to operate. Indeed, some of the internal entrenchment is due to the lingering Treaty-based specificity of the security and defence component, which remains separated from the political and global goods sections and risk(like MFAs and MoDs at the national level) leading their own lives. The successive adjustments to the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, while commendable, have sometimes been at the expense of the Commission’s and/or member states’ willingness to engage with the Service(cf. the choice of location for the office of the HRVP in the EEAS). Within the complex structure of the EEAS nevertheless lies an opportunity that should not be wasted: to better‘integrate’ the(three) main building blocks of the architecture(Commission, Council, member states). Efforts to break down(cultural) barriers and silos, mix and move staff around should thus be redoubled. 10|