This paper looks at military and non-military aspects of the measures aimed to deter Russia. Three deterrence-related issues are addressed by the paper. First, the paper looks at key components of deterrence. It claims that deterrence is strengthened by Russia’s relatively low interest in the Baltic states and Poland. Strengthening of the national military capabilities and NATO collective defence efforts also contributes to deterrence. The uncertainty related to Russia’s ability to control escalation during a military conflict also plays a significant role. NATO member states’ convincing Russia that it would not be able to control escalatory processes and that its attempts at de-escalation may fail can also strengthen NATO deterrence.

Second, the paper looks at defence sector developments in a number of the Baltic Sea region countries. Most countries are focusing predominantly on deterrence by denial, and the overall NATO defence posture has been mostly defensive. A few states, however, have taken steps that can be characterized as deterrence by punishment (Sweden and Finland). This is evidence that countries are not entirely convinced that deterrence by denial would be effective.

Third, this paper also looks at the potential contribution of arms control instruments to stability in NATO-Russia relations. These instruments have been hardly used in recent years because the Baltic states and Poland have not been willing to explore them. They regard the current standoff between NATO and Russia as a historical opportunity to strengthen NATO presence in Northern Europe. Their concern is that arms control instruments would negate NATO military presence in the region. It should, however, be noted that arms control instruments can contribute to peace and stability as they would likely reduce Russia’s military presence nearby the borders of the Baltic states and Poland and ensure greater transparency of military activities on both sides.