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Schlaglicht Israel Nr. 14/14 Aktuelles aus israelischen Tageszeitungen 1.- 15. September2014 1. Resümee Gazakrieg Nach gut sechs Wochen heftiger Kämpfe und mehrerer gescheiterter Feuerpausen zwischen Israel und der Hamas im Gazastreifen fiel schließlich am 26. August der vorerst letzte Schuss. Unter ägyptischer Vermittlung und der palästinensischen Fatah-Führung im Westjordanland einigten sich die Konfliktparteien auf eine unbefristete Waffenruhe und Verhandlungen über langfristige Lösungen für den Gazastreifen, die Ende September in Kairo aufgenommen werden sollen. Das Resümee der Kämpfe ist bei den Führungen auf beiden Seiten positiv. Die Regierung in Jerusalem zeigte sich befriedigt über die Zerstörung der geheimen Tunnel und der Infrastruktur der Hamas, die insgesamt stark geschwächt worden sei. Der Hamas wiederum reichte es, Israels Armee bis zum letzten Tag Widerstand geleistet zu haben, um von einem Sieg zu sprechen. Hamas and Israel rave the limitations of brute force "Operation Protective Edge" is entering its second phase that of shaping images and perceptions. Politicians claim victory, journalists grade the two sides for their humanity or lack thereof, and everyone debates the identities of the fatalities. The battle over perceptions is crucial, but before we slip into it we should assess what happened in the war itself. In a nutshell, Hamas and Israel became painfully aware of the limits of their power. Both sides realized that the fantasies that they cultivated in recent years have crashed against the rocks of reality.() is much less than what the Hamas was banking on. Militarily speaking, Hamas's poor offensive performance buried, literally and metaphorically, ten years of intense efforts in the sands of Gaza. If Hamas came face to face with its military shortcomings, Israel rediscovered that it was unwilling to pay a high price for the temporary destruction of Hamas. It would seem that Israel has the military capacity to destroy Hamas's infrastructure and reach its leadership, but to do so it would have to pay dearly in soldiers' lives, in an economic crisis and triggering an international imbroglio. Such a steep price makes a maneuver into Gaza untenable() Hama s and Israel have both experienced rude awakenings, as each had to face the limitations of its power. Diplomacy would have been a logical way to move forward and steer clear of a military dead-end. However, for the time being this is a worthless insight, since both sides clutch desperately to yesteryear's dreams, refuse to face up to their weaknesses, and are incapable of making painful concessions. Mutual hatred and distrust continue to dictate policy, and preclude taking the minimal risks required for entering the diplomatic path. Nimrod Hurvitz, HAA, 04.09.14 Israel won Gaza war after all Hamas lost most of its rockets, the tunnel system in which it invested a fortune, a long list of senior military wing members, about 1,000 fighters, headquarters, emergency supplies, etc. All of its attempts to surprise Israel with unusual actions() failed with no exception. The same applies to the situation in the diplomatic arena: Hamas has lost the support it had left in the Arab world, and its rivals in the region(the Palestinian Authority and Egypt) have grown stronger. Its political situation in the Strip has deteriorated as well: The gap between the 1