WERNER KAMPPETER European Integration and the Price of Peace* BEITRÄGE/ARTICLES I f there is a constant in European history, it is war. Our political systems and the people at the top of them were somehow prone to generate ever new situations of conflict and to solve them by violent means. European history is an almost incessant stream of blood, misery and destruction – within Europe itself and elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, the width and depth of this stream increased with the size and the strength of cen­trally organised states and with the development of military technology. Against this historical background, Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe have enjoyed half a century of unprecedented peace and prosperity. Almost two generations have not been involved in a war nor have they experienced the misery it causes. The absence of war is in itself an amazing and precious achieve­ment. Yet, what is even more amazing and pre­cious is, what might be called, a new culture of conflict management: Of course there are still con­flicts and plenty of conflicting interests, but we fol­low accepted procedures that lead to negotiated solutions. Even more importantly, we can be certain that all conflicts are resolved peacefully, that is without recourse to military force and to the menace of military force. Military force has simply ceased to be part of tactical and strategic games that are played within the European Union( EU ). In this sense we can say that the EU has become a peace community: It is characterised not only by the absence of war, but by the absence of the pos­sibility of war among its members. 1 Small wonder that the neighbouring countries of the EU have, apart from the economic benefits they expect, such a strong interest in joining the club. If the process of European integration can be credited with converting the belligerent Europe of the past into a non-aggressive and stable peace community, then many of the institutional, de­mocratic and economic deficiencies of the EU ne­ces-sarily may be seen in a much milder light. On the other hand, it would be very worth while to find out whether other regions in the world could learn any lessons from this process of integration. »To learn from history« is an old and contro­versial issue. Historic circumstances are never the same. Besides, there is always the danger of teleo­logical constructions: Because Europe after half a century of integration has become a peace com­munity(itself a mental construction), one looks for all the elements in history which contributed to this end, that is, reinterpreting them in the light of the final outcome – and excluding or overlooking many other elements which in their time were of much greater importance than is admitted within such a perspective. It is, for instance, commonly assumed that the basis of European integration was economic inte­gration. As European integration was a success in pacifying formerly belligerent nations, it is then argued that other regions too should integrate economically in order to develop more harmo­nious relationships. Such inferences about European integration are not warranted and even false: European inte­gration was from the very beginning an essentially political integration. Economic integration was at times instrumentalised to that end, but its overall contribution to the pacification of the European continent was and remains limited. * This paper is simultaneously published in Japanese in: Uno, Shigeyaki, ed., Hokuto ajia chiiki kenkyu josetsu, Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2000 . 1 . Cf. Zielinsky, 1995 , p. 18 . IPG 2/2000 Werner Kamppeter, European Integration and the Price of Peace 123