MAHDI ABDUL-HADI Israelis and Palestinians: Towards a New Chapter of the Conflict P alestinian-Israeli negotiations for a peaceful settlement of a hundred years of conflict offici­ally began, under international guidance, at the Madrid Conference in October 1991 . This was the starting point for what became a series of multi­track negotiations based on the twin formulas of land-for-peace and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 . The two parties, however, reached the essential point of mutual recognition not out of any identi­fication with or acceptance of the other’s histori­cal, political or cultural narrative, but rather out of a submission to the pressures of the respec­tive Realpolitik of their situation. In the hope of ensuring their own internal political interests and of overcoming mounting external pressures, each side assumed the necessary positions of mutual accommodation. The Political Dynamics of Frustration in the Occupied Palestinian Territories The Israelis realized that they could not simply maintain an endless policy of control and occupa­tion vis-à-vis the Palestinians, nor could they rid themselves of the»problem« by conducting a mass transfer policy against them. In addition, they had finally recognized their failure in manufacturing a malleable Palestinian leadership, which could replace the popular PLO and had begun to fear a further»Islamification of resistance«, which had emerged in the Occupied Palestinian Territories ( OPT ) during the first Intifada( 1987–1993 ). Meanwhile, the PLO establishment, with its headquarters in Tunis, – often referred to as the »outsiders« – was weakened, isolated and facing imminent political and financial bankruptcy in the wake of the Gulf War. Further»threats« to the tenuous nature of their leadership lay in the rapid growth in popularity of the Islamic resistance movements in the territories and the long-stan­ding desire of the Israeli establishment to remove them from any future scenario, focusing instead on the»insiders«, i. e., the local political elites and activists in the OPT . The US invitation to the Madrid peace conference exposed this de-facto crisis of leadership and competition for the first time as Palestinian disagreement grew over who should be represented by whom, and who exactly should eventually attend to negotiate. Questions of legitimacy, mandate and representation were raised as the Palestinian political establishment, both»inside« and»outside« sought to resolve under what banner or»umbrella« Palestine would be officially presented. It was the»insiders« – active on the ground in both confronting the occupiers and drafting pro­posals for an interim period- who convinced the»outsiders« to go ahead and overcome the humiliating conditions that the Israeli Govern­ment had imposed on the Palestinians with re­gard to the Madrid Conference. The PLO , worried about the future role of the»insiders« and their potential to become future alternative leaders rather than loyal negotiators, eventually decided to appoint a delegation acceptable to Israel and com­posed of»insiders«, not least to avoid marginaliza­tion and prevent the»inside« from becoming a emerging Palestinian leadership. Thus, at Madrid itself, different, and not wholly compatible, forces drew the Palestinian and Israeli sides forward, while their respective long­term goals were equally opposed and they con­tinued to hold utterly contradictory perceptions of each other’s national movement. Israel sought to finally secure official recognition of the Jewish state, amounting to a Palestinian endorsement of Zionism and its pre­1967 political achievements. However, in addition they set out to procure Palestinian acceptance of»sharing«, through a limited autonomy, the 22 percent of what was left IPG 3/2001 Mahdi Abdul-Hadi, Israelis and Palestinians: Towards a New Chapter of the Conflict 235